The central legal point established in the judgment is the reliance on historical documents and public records to determine the ownership of disputed property.

JUDGMENT

(Prayer: Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of C.P.C, against the judgment and decree dated 16.07.1999 made in A.S.No.121 of 1996 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Tankasi reversing the judgement and decree dated 28.10.1996 made in O.S.No.144 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tenkasi.)

1. The defendant is the appellant.

2. The plaintiffs had filed O.S.No.144 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tenkasi for the relief of declaration that the second item of the suit schedule property belongs to the first plaintiff and for permanent injunction. The plaintiffs had further prayed for declaration that the third suit schedule property is a common lane belonging to the plaintiffs and the defendant and for consequential injunction restraining the defendant from putting up any construction in the suit lane. The suit was dismissed in entirety by the trial Court. The plaintiffs had filed A.S.No.121 of 1996 before the Principal Subordinate Court, Tenkasi. The learned Subordinate Judge was pleased to confirm the dismissal of the suit with regard to the second schedule. However, the learned First Appellate Judge reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court with regard to the third schedule of property and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff. As against the same, the present second appeal has been filed by the defendant.

3. Since the plaintiffs have not challenged the dismissal of the suit with regard to the second schedule of property by the First Appellate Court, the pleadings that are relevant for deciding the second appeal with regard to the third schedule of property are extracted as follows.

4. The plaintiffs had contended that there was a partition within the family members of the plaintiffs under Exhibit A2 partition deed dated 16.08.1951. Under the said partition deed, the present suit third item has been shown as 9th schedule of property. The said 9th schedule has been shown as a common lane for the plaintiffs and the defendant ancestrally. The said third schedule property is shown as 'G.H.I.J' in the plaint plan.

5. The defendant filed a written statement contending that it is the exclusive property of the defendant. Though there is a reference about the common lane in Exhibit A2 partition deed, that would not be binding upon the defendant, in view of the fact that the defendant is not a party to the said document. The defendant had further contended that there was a previous partition in the plaintiffs' family under Exhibit B1 partition deed dated 07.08.1918. In the said document, a different lane has been mentioned as a common lane. The present third schedule property has not been shown as a common lane in Exhibit B1. When Exhibit B1 does not disclose the present third schedule property as a common lane, the recital in Exhibit A2 will not confer any right upon the plaintiffs. The defendant had further contended that the said third schedule property was never used by the plaintiffs to reach the road on the northern side. In fact, the plaintiffs are only entitled to use a common lane on the southern side to reach the southern road. Hence, the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit.

6. The trial court after considering the rival documents filed on either side and the oral evidence, arrived at a finding that the plaintiffs have not established their title or possession over the second schedule property. The trial Court further found that since the third schedule property was not referred to in Exhibit B1 partition deed of the year 1918, any reference in Exhibit A2 dated 16.08.1951 will not confer any right upon the defendant. On the said findings, the trial Court dismissed the suit with regard to the second and third schedule of properties.

7. The First Appellate Court concurred with the findings of the trial Court with regard to the second schedule of property and confirmed the dismissal of the prayer with regard to the second schedule of property. However, the Fir