1974 Supreme(Ori) 73
Orissa High Court
R. N. MISRA, AND K. B. PANDA, JJ.
Regional Transport Authority, Phulbani - Appellant
Versus
Purna Chandra Agrawala - Respondents
O. J. C. No. 204 of 1973
Decided On : 5 July 1974
Standing Counsel (Tr), for Petitioner; Y.S.N. Murty and Y.V.R. Murty, for Opposite Parties.
An appeal before the appellate authority under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act becomes infructuous with the lapse of time for which the temporary permit was sought, and the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and issue directions.
Headnote:
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - TEMPORARY PERMIT - APPEAL - MAINTAINABILITY - LAPSE OF TIME - QUASI-PERMANENT PERMIT - NOT PROVIDED UNDER THE ACT - GUIDELINES BY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL - NOT BINDING.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, Regional Transport Authority, Phulbani, challenged the appellate order passed by the opposite party No. 3 under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The opposite party No. 1, the owner of a stage carriage vehicle more than ten years old, had applied for a temporary permit, which was rejected by the petitioner on the ground that the vehicle was not entitled to a temporary permit as per Rule 65-C of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules. The opposite party No. 1 filed an appeal before the opposite party No. 3, who directed the petitioner to consider the application afresh and to keep on considering applications for grant of temporary permits for a period of two years.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the appeal had become infructuous with the lapse of time and the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and issue the impugned directions. The court also held that there is no provision for a quasi-permanent permit under the Act and that too frequent grant of temporary permits for one vehicle on the same route does not make it quasi-permanent.
Issues: 1. Whether the appeal before the appellate authority was maintainable after the lapse of time for which the temporary permit was sought? 2. Whether the appellate authority could issue guidelines for the grant of temporary permits?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. A temporary permit under Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act has a life for a maximum period of four months and is available only for the stated purpose. The application for a temporary permit must indicate the period and justification for the permit. With the lapse of time, the application ceases to exist and no permit can be granted. 2. The appellate authority is not a Court of record and its decisions have no precedent value. It cannot issue guidelines for the grant of temporary permits.
Final Decision: The court quashed the impugned order of the appellate authority and held that the application for the temporary permit was no more to be considered as it had ceased to exist by lapse of time.
Judgement
R. N. MISRA, J. :- The Regional Transport Authority, Phulbani is the petitioner and this application is directed against the appellate order under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) passed by the opposite party No. 3. The opposite party No. 1, the owner of a stage carriage vehicle more than ten years old by the time an application for a temporary permit in respect of the vehicle was made to the Transport Authority, filed an appeal before the opposite party No. 3 aggrieved by the rejection of the application by the petitioner Transport Authority on the ground that the stage carriage in respect of which the temporary permit had been asked for was more than ten years old and, therefore, in terms of Rule 65-C of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules which the Transport Authority had adopted by resolution sometime in 1971, the stage carriage was not entitled to a temporary permit. Before the appellate authority the learned standing counsel appearing for the petitioner-respondent contended that the appeal had become infructuous because the period in respect of which the temporary permit had been asked for having lapsed the application was no more available for consideration. The preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal was overruled. The appellate authority proceeded on the footing that on account of frequent grant of temporary permits on the route to the vehicle it was almost a quasi-permanent permit and ultimately by its final order had directed the Transport Authority to consider the application afresh and to keep on onsidering applications for grant of temporary permits for a period of two years on the rooting of instructions issued by the State Government in certain other connected matters. It is against this appellate order that this writ application has been filed. The opposite party No. 1 who succeeded before the appellate authority has not entered appearance in spite of notice from this court. The learned standing counsel reiterates the contention raised in the appeal that the appeal itself had become infructuous and it was not competent for the appellate authority to entertain the appeal and issue the impugned directions.
2. A temporary permit under Section 62 of the Act has a life for a maximum period of four months. As the provisions in the statute require, a temporary permit is available only for the stated purpose and in that respect is very different from a permanent permit. In the appropriate application prescribed under the rules the period for which the application is made has to be indicated and the two termini have to be fixed. Justification for a temporary permit for the said period has to be indicated and upon satisfaction of the existence of such purpose the appropriate Transport Authority is clothed with the restriction to grant such a permit. When the opposite party No. 1 applied for the impugned temporary permit, he must have indicated as to why and for what period a temporary permit was being asked for. Obviously with the lapse of the time unless new justification is shown and a fresh application is made on the basis of the application which has lapsed out, no permit is available to be granted. In such circumstances the objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel before the appellate authority was very definite and had to be sustained. There was no justification for the Appellate Tribunal to have taken a different view in the matter. We have no doubts in our mind that the appeal had ceased to be maintainable with the lapse of time and the reasoning advanced by the appellate Tribunal is not sustainable in law.
3. Erroneously enough the appellate Tribunal referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 156 (M. P. S. R. T. Corporation v. R. T. Authority) and was of the view that even if the appeal was not maintainable and had to be dismissed it was open to it to indicate guideline. On more than one occasion this Court has indic