A landlord can evict a tenant if the house is required in good faith for occupation by the landlord's husband, even if the house is to be dismantled and used as a vacant site.

Judgement

DAS, J. :- Opposite party No. 1 is the landlady of the house situated in Oriya Bazar in Cuttack City. Petitioner is the monthly tenant thereof. Opposite party No. 1 filed a petition under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for eviction of the petitioner on three grounds: (a) husband of opposite party No. 1 who is a practising lawyer in Puri town wants to shift his practice to Cuttack and as such the house is to be re-modelled and made fit for occupation; (b) the house has been sub-let by the petitioner without consent of opposite party No. 1; and (c) according to the terms of the oral agreement which was entered into by the parties, petitioner was to effect necessary annual thatching and incidental repair to the suit premises, but without effecting any such repair or thatching he had deducted the amount from the monthly rent payable by him and thereby has caused acts of damage which has materially impaired the value of the house. The petitioner combated all the grounds of eviction.

2. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority have concurrently upheld all the grounds of eviction. The tenant has filed the writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging all the grounds of eviction.

3. Section 7 (2) of the Act, so far as material, is to the following effect: "(2) If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied-

(i) xx xx xx

(ii) that the tenant has without consent of the landlord-

(a) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the entire house or any portion thereof (if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so) or

(b) used the house for a purpose other than that for which it was let out; or

(iii) that the tenant has committed such acts of damage as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the house;

(iv) xx xx xx

he shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house........." Sub-section (4) of Section 7 runs as follows:

"The landlord may, subject to the provision of this Act, apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the house, if he requires the house in good faith for the occupation or use of himself, any member of his family or of any person or persons for whose benefit the house is held by him."

4. Mr. Mohanty did not rightly challenge the findings about sub-letting and damage caused to the house which are pure findings of fact. These two grounds are sufficient to sustain the order of eviction.

5. It is, however, contended by him that the husband of opposite party No. 1 does not purport to shift his practice to Cuttack and even if he does, the shifting cannot be considered as requirement in good faith for occupation by the landlady. Section 7 (4) of the Act clearly provides that even if the occupation is required for any member of the family of the owner it will be a requirement of the house in good faith. The authorities below have concurrentiy found that the husband intends to shift his practice to Cuttack. This finding is essentially one of fact and cannot be assailed in writ jurisdiction.

6. It is further contended that the landlady wants to remodel and repair the house for occupation after dismantling the same and that dismantling a house cannot be said to be requirement in good faith for occupation. Reliance is placed on (1973) 39 Cut LT 946 (Sadhana Ausadhalaya v. Moningi Nookamma). The landlord in that case wanted eviction on the ground that he wanted a vacant parking area for his adjacent cinema house and for that purpose wanted to dismantle the house. He did not plead and adduce evidence satisfactorily that the area covered by the house was necessary for parking of cars. The Division Bench doubted whether the space occupied by the house was big enough to provide accommodation for two ordinary vehicles to be parked conveniently. In paragraph 6 of t