The finding of the Civil Court on a reference under Section 146, Cr. P. C. is not assailable in a criminal revision against the final order of the Magistrate passed in a proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P. C. in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court.

G. K. MISRA, J.

( 1 ) THE facts of this case have been clearly stated in the orders of reference. The disputed land is the property belonging to the deity Raghunath Jiu. The members of the first party and second party members 1 to 5 are co-sebaits of the deity. In the written statement filed by the first party, it was stated that the entire body of co-sebayats were in joint possession of the disputed land, but that the second party members 6 to 22, in connivance with second party members 1 to 5 were trying to oust them from their lawful possession over the disputed land. The first party members filed an application for taking action under Section 145, Cr. P. C. as there was apprehension of breach of the peace. The case of second party members 6 to 22 was that the disputed land was settled with them on acceptance of salami by the entire body of the Sebayats of the deity and that they were in possession of different portions of the land settled with them in 1960. Though the settlement deeds were scribed and executed by second party members 1 to 5, members of the first party did not join in the matter of execution. They claimed possession of different portions of the land after reclamation at huge costs. The second party members 1 to 5 did not file any written statement. Second party member No. 1 examined himself as a witness and supported the case of the second party members 6 to 22. A reference was made to the Civil Court under section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. as the Magistrate was unable to decide as to which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order. The Munsif to whom the case had been referred, transmitted his finding under Section 146 (1b)holding that members of the first party were in possession of the disputed land on the date of the preliminary order. The Magistrate on receipt of the finding disposed of the proceeding under Section 145, Cr. P. C. in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court declaring possession of the first party.

( 2 ) BEFORE the learned Sessions Judge, two points were raised-

(i) The order under Section 145, Cr. P. C. was illegal as separate possession of land claimed by the second party members 6 to 22 on the strength of different deeds was covered by one proceeding; and (ii) The Magistrate committed an illegality in declaring exclusive possession of the first party. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the first contention in Criminal Revision No. 3 M of 1965 and the point has not been pressed. On the second point the learned Sessions Judge was

of opinion that on the case of the first party in the written statement itself, the order of the learned Magistrate declaring exclusive possession of the first party over the disputed land should be quashed and that in its place, both the members of the first party and the second party members 1 to 5 should be declared to be entitled to joint possession thereof until evicted therefrom in the course of law, forbidding all disturbance of possession by second party members 5 to 22 until such eviction.

( 3 ) MR. Misra advanced two contentions :

(i) That the written statement of the first party was wrongly construed by the learned Sessions Judge and that there was no admission therein that they were in possession with the second party members 1 to 5; and (ii) When assuming that the finding of the learned Magistrate is contrary to the admitted case of the first party in the written statement, no revision under Section 146 (1d) lies against the finding of the Civil Court given on a reference under this section, though the final order passed by the Magistrate in conformity with the decision of the Civil Court is assailed in revision.

( 4 ) THE first contention has no substance. Though in paragraph 2 of the written statement of the first party, there was an assertion that they were all along in possession of the disputed property and that they were in possession on the date of the preliminary order, there was a clear admission in paragraph