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1974 Supreme(Ori) 59

HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
R. N. Misra And B. K. Ray, JJ.
JADUMANI PRADHAN - Appellant
Versus
SRINIBASH SAHU AND ORS. - Respondent
O. J. C.  742  Of  1972
Decided On : April 30, 1974

Advocates Appeared:
R.MOHANTY, S.C.PARIJA

The grant of a permit to operate a stage carriage is subject to the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which empowers the Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage carriages on a route. However, this provision is not applicable to cases where the RTA is filling up a vacancy rather than granting a new permit.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 47 (3) - SECTION 48 - SECTION 57 - GRANT OF PERMIT - LIMIT ON NUMBER OF STAGE CARRIAGES - PREFERENCE BETWEEN APPLICANTS - COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF EARNINGS - HEADNOTE : [MOTOR VEHICLES ACT] - [GRANT OF PERMIT] - [SECTION 47 (3), 48, 57] - [LIMIT ON NUMBER OF STAGE CARRIAGES - PREFERENCE BETWEEN APPLICANTS - COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF EARNINGS]

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner was granted a permit to operate a stage carriage on a route where a vacancy had arisen due to the withdrawal of another operator. The opposite party No. 1, a competing applicant, appealed against the grant of permit to the petitioner, contending that the Regional Transport Authority (RTA) was bound to limit the number of stage carriages on the route before granting any permit and that the RTA had erred in preferring the petitioner over him.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the grant of permit to the petitioner was not vitiated on account of non-compliance with the requirements of Section 47 (3) of the Act, as the provision was not applicable to the facts of the case where the RTA was filling up a vacancy rather than granting a new permit. The court also held that the Appellate Tribunal had erred in determining the question of preference between the petitioner and the opposite party No. 1, as the RTA had not stated that the opposite party No. 1 was not entitled to a permit because he did not possess a vehicle, but had preferred the petitioner based on his experience and the availability of a ready vehicle of an acceptable model.

Issues: 1. Whether the grant of permit to the petitioner was vitiated on account of non-compliance with the requirements of Section 47 (3) of the Act? 2. Whether the Appellate Tribunal had erred in determining the question of preference between the petitioner and the opposite party No. 1? 3. Whether the direction for compensation was appropriate in law?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 47 (3) of the Act empowers the RTA to limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified areas or on any specified route within the region. However, this provision is not applicable to cases where the RTA is filling up a vacancy rather than granting a new permit. 2. The RTA is entitled to prefer one applicant over another based on factors such as experience, availability of a ready vehicle of an acceptable model, and spare vehicle to work as a stand-by, as the paramount consideration under the Act is the convenience of the travelling public. 3. The direction for compensation was not appropriate in law, as the Appellate Tribunal had erred in reversing the conclusion of the RTA.

Final Decision: The court allowed the application, quashed the appellate order, and directed that the grant order by the Transport Authority shall stand restored.

R. N. MISRA. J.

( 1 ) THIS is an application for a writ of certiorari directed against the appellate order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (opposite party No. 2 ).

( 2 ) ON the Sambalpur-Kuchinda road lying within the district of Sambal-pur under the jurisdiction of the Transport Authority (opposite party No. 3) a vacancy was caused on account of an old operator (Sri Purohit) ceasing to ply his vehicle. Steps were taken by the Transport Authority to fill up the vacancy and the petitioner was granted the permit. The opposite party No. 1 who was a competing applicant appealed to the Appellate authority (opposite party No. 2) against the rejection of his application. He mainly contended that the R. T. A. (opposite party No. 3) was bound to limit the number of stage carriages on the route before the permit could be granted. He also disputed the grounds provided by the Transport Authority for preferring the petitioner to him. The Appellate Authority was of the view that determination by the R. T. A. under section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act IV of 1939) (hereafter referred to as the Act) of the limit was a condition precedent to grant of any permit and that having not been done, the grant of permit was illegal. He concluded the decision on the point by saying :

"from the above discussion of law and admitted facts it is clear that the omission on the part of the R. T. A. in prescribing the limit of number of stage carriages resulted in a failure of justice to the prejudice of the appellant. The right to obtain a stage carriage permit is a right created by the M. V. Act which also prescribes the procedure regulating, the grant of such permits. The right must therefore be determined in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules made under it. Since admittedly the M. V. Act it must be held that it had no jurisdiction to consider the applications and grant the impugned permit to respondent No. 2 (sic ). It has to be therefore concluded that the impugned order granting the permit to respondent No. 2 was illegal and contrary to law. . . . . "

Next, coming to the question of preference, the Appellate Authority stated'--

"it has been contended by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that the appellant had no spare bus on which ground the permit was refused to him. In this connection the learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to AIR 1960 Mys 33, where it has been held that neither the Act nor the rules require that in order to be eligible to apply for a permit the applicant should possess a vehicle on the date of his application for a permit. This provides sufficient answer to the respondent's contention that the appellant had no spare bus. Further, roadworthiness is the criterion but not the latest model. In AIR 1956 Raj 142 (FB) it has been pointed out that the R. T. A. shall have regard to the effect upon existing services of the applicants. Public interest must be the paramount consideration. One should not be carried away by the latest model of the vehicle. The long experience of the operator and his sector qualification and his acts of sincerity should be given due weight in considering the applications. It has been pointed out in AIR 1956 andh Pra 217. that the reason in awarding a permit in favour of one operator that he is ,a resident of a place which is on the route is relevant. Looking from any angle, the appellant has better sector qualifications than the respondent No. 2 and as such this point has to be decided in favour of the appellant and against the respondent. "

It appears that the petitioner had been permitted to ply his vehicle during the pendency of the appeal and he had been depositing at the rate of Rs. 30/- per day with the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority under orders of the Tribunal in order that the opposite party No. 1 in the event of his success in the appeal may be compensated. With a view to compensating the opposite party No. 1, the tr












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