Sanction under Section 197, Cr. P. C. is not required when the prosecution is not vexatious and the alleged misappropriation was not committed while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duties.

V. GOPALASWAMY, J.

( 1 ) THIS revision is preferred against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Boudha-Khondmals, Phulbani, in Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 1985 confirming the order of conviction and sentence passed against the accused-petitioner by the trial Court under Section 409/34, I. P. C.

( 2 ) THE gist of prosecution case is that the accused-petitioner was the Sarpanch of Madaguda Gram Panchayat during the relevant period and that he along with the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat (the co-accused in the case) in furtherance of their common intention had misappropriated an amount of Rs. 19,500/- from out of the Gram Panchayat funds and thereby rendered themselves liable under Section 409/34, I. P. C.

( 3 ) THE prosecution has examined in all fifteen witnesses to prove its case. The plea of the petitioner was one of denial. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the petitioner in support of his plea.

( 4 ) AS a Court of revision I am not expected to re-appraise the evidence. The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the legality of the judgments of the Courts below on some legal grounds which I am considering below.

( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no valid sanction for prosecuting the petitioner. The offence alleged against the petitioner and the co-accused was that in furtherance of their common intention they have misappropriated the Gram Panchayat funds and rendered themselves liable under S. 409/34, I. P. C. The object of Section 197, Cr. P. C. is to protect the public servants from vexatious prosecution at the instance of a member of public. As a public servant in discharge of his duties is exposed to the public, it is necessary to afford him the protection under S. 197, Cr. P. C. The provision under Section 197, Cr. P. C. is meant to shield a public servant against frivolous prosecution, but is not meant to serve as a sword to attack a genuine prosecution. In this case it was the B. D. O. who had lodged the F. I. R. against the accused persons under Section 409/34, I. P. C. So by no stretch of imagination can it be said that prosecution was either vexatious or that the alleged misappropriation was committed by the petitioner while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties. Hence in the facts of the present case no sanction under Section 197, Cr. P. C. is at all necessary to prosecute the accused persons. So both the courts below rightly rejected the contention of the petitioner that the prosecution was vitiated for want of due sanction.

( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that as the prosecution against the accused was in relation to five instances of misappropriation during the course of a year, the same is violative of Section 219, Cr. P. C. But then on a perusal of the evidence in the case it is clear that the series of acts of misappropriation alleged against the petitioner are so connected together as to form the same transaction and so the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the framing of the charge was defective is not tenable in view of the provision under Section 220 (1), Cr. P. C. Even otherwise also there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner because of the manner in which the charge was framed. That apart, under Section 465 (2), Cr. P. C. in case an accused prejudiced by any error in the framing of a charge, he should raise the objection at the earlier stage. Admittedly the contention regarding the defect in the framing of the charge is raised for the first time in this Court. Considering all aspects of the matter, the argument that there was defective framing of charge is without any substance.

( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients of dishonest intention and for that reason also the charge under S. 409, I. PC. against the petitioner must fail. Intention is always a matter of inference. In the present cas