The principle of res ipsa loquitur applies in cases where the circumstances of the accident are such that it is improbable that it would have occurred without the negligence of the defendant.

P. C. MISRA, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner in this writ application is an unfortunate father whose son Abhiram Lal died on 9-6-1988 at about 1. 00 a. m. near Manikghosh bazar in the town of Cuttack having come in contact with a live electric wire detached from the electric pole. He was coming on a bicycle and could not know of the existence of the hanging live wire and got electrocuted when he came in contact with the said live wire. The petitioner has prayed for a direction to the opposite parties to pay adequate compensation which, according to the petitioner, occurred on account of the gross negligence of the Electricity Board.

( 2 ) THE petitioner has alleged that the Electricity Board is guilty of negligence as due care and caution was not taken by it for maintenance of the electric wires used for supply of electricity and it has further been alleged that in spite of information to the local electric sub-station, no preventive action was taken to disconnect the power line even after the detachment of the live wire from the electric pole. The petitioner issued a notice to the Electricity Board on 2-11-1989 claiming a compensation of Rs, 1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh only) copy of which is Annexure 1 to the writ application. Since no action was taken on the aforesaid application, the petitioner has filed this writ application for appropriate relief.

( 3 ) NOTICE was issued at the stage of admission to the opposite parties indicating therein that the writ application is likely to be disposed of at that stage. On receipt of the notice the opposite parties have filed a counter-affidavit denying their liability to pay any compensation to the petitioner. In the counter-affidavit it has also been stated that the death of the petitioner's son was not due to rash and negligent conduct of the opposite parties, but it was due to unavoidable causes for which the opposite parties are not responsible. There was stormy weather on the fateful night and due to storm the live wire on the electric pole got detached. According to the opposite parties, the Electricity Board cannot be held responsible for snapping of live electric wire due to stormy weather in the dead of the night. The maintainability of the writ application has also been challenged on the ground that alternative remedy by way of suit is available to the petitioner. The opposite parties have also contended that this Court exercising writ jurisdiction would not be the proper forum for determination of the quantum of compensation as the same would depend on various other factors mostly involving disputed questions of fact.

( 4 ) THOUGH the counter-affidavit filed by the opposite parties was captioned as 'preliminary Counter Affidavit', the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties submitted that he has nothing further to add to the said preliminary counter-affidavit. The writ application, therefore, was taken up for final disposal at the request and consent of both sides.

( 5 ) THE death of petitioner's son Abhiram Lal on 9-6-1988 in the dead of the night being electrocuted coming in contact with a live hanging electric wire has not been disputed. At the hearing it was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties that the above fact is not sufficient by itself to hold that the opposite parties are liable to compensate the petitioner unless it is proved that the opposite parties were negligent and as a result thereof the petitioner's son met his death. To elaborate the aforesaid point it has been contended by the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties that the weather was stormy and a live wire having been detached from the pole could not be noticed in the dead of the night. According to the opposite parties, the petitioner would not be entitled to any compensation from the Electricity Board without proof of the element of negligence in the aforesaid circumstances. In reply to the aforesaid contention the learned counsel appearing for the