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1996 Supreme(Ori) 153
High Court Of Orissa
P. C. NAIK, DEEPAK MISRA
JOGESWAR MAJHI - Appellant
Versus
RAMIA KISAN @ LAKRA - Respondent
ORIGINAL JURDN. CASE 4028 Of 1992
Decided On : 09/25/1996
B.P.ROY, Jairaj Behera, PRADIP MOHANTY
The word 'person' in Section 3(A) of Regulation 2/1956 refers to a person other than a member of a Scheduled Tribe. The purpose of the Regulation is to protect the rights of Scheduled Tribe members from exploitation by non-Scheduled Tribe members.
Headnote:
REGULATION 2/1956 - SECTION 3(A) - TRANSFER OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY - INTERPRETATION OF 'PERSON' - APPLICABILITY TO SCHEDULED TRIBE MEMBERS - PROTECTION OF SCHEDULED TRIBE RIGHTS - PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF REGULATION.
Fact of the Case:
A member of a Scheduled Tribe (petitioner) filed an application under Section 3(A) of Regulation 2/1956, seeking restoration of possession of immovable property from another member of a Scheduled Tribe (opposite party). The Sub-Collector allowed the application and directed the Tahasildar to restore possession to the petitioner. The opposite party appealed to the Additional District Magistrate (ADM), who reversed the Sub-Collector's order, holding that Section 3(A) was not applicable to members of Scheduled Tribes.
Finding of the Court:
The Orissa High Court held that the word 'person' in Section 3(A) of Regulation 2/1956 refers to a person other than a member of a Scheduled Tribe. The court interpreted the Regulation as a whole, considering its preamble, various provisions, and the legislative intent. It found that the purpose of the Regulation was to protect the rights of Scheduled Tribe members from exploitation by non-Scheduled Tribe members.
Issues: 1. Whether the word 'person' in Section 3(A) of Regulation 2/1956 includes members of Scheduled Tribes. 2. Whether Section 3(A) is applicable to transactions between members of Scheduled Tribes.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court applied the purposive approach to interpretation, considering the object and purpose of the Regulation. It held that the word 'person' in Section 3(A) should be interpreted in a manner that promotes the Regulation's objective of protecting Scheduled Tribe members. 2. The court found that the Regulation was intended to regulate transactions between Scheduled Tribe members and non-Scheduled Tribe members, not transactions between Scheduled Tribe members themselves. Therefore, Section 3(A) was not applicable to the dispute between the petitioner and the opposite party, both of whom were members of Scheduled Tribes.
Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the application filed by the petitioner under Section 3(A) was not maintainable since he was a member of the Scheduled Tribe. The court declined to address other issues raised in the petition.
Key Points: - The regulation aims to protect Scheduled Tribe members from exploitation by non-Scheduled Tribe members. (!) - The term "person" in Section 3(A) should be read as excluding Scheduled Tribe members, i.e., means a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe. (!) (!) - Section 3(A) is applicable to unauthorised occupation or transfers involving a Schedule Tribe member and a non-member, not to intra-Scheduled Tribe transactions. (!) (!) - The court used purposive construction, considering the preamble and object of the Regulation to interpret "person." (!) (!) (!) - The decision dismisses the writ application since the petitioner was a Schedule Tribe member; Section 3(A) not applicable to him. (!) - Prior authority cited (Subhadra Pradhan) supports that "person" means a non-Scheduled Tribe person for purposes of protection. (!) (!) (!) - The Sub-Collector’s cryptic order was criticized; reasons and adequate opportunity required in proceedings. (!) - Section 7 provides penalties to non-tribe possessors, reinforcing protection of Schedule Tribe rights. (!) - The judgment emphasizes interpretive approach: look to object, context, and legislative intent; avoid overbroad readings. (!) (!)
Question 1?
How to interpret the word "person" in Section 3(A) of Regulation 2/1956 in the context of protecting Scheduled Tribe rights?
Question 2?
What is the applicability of Section 3(A) to transactions between members of Scheduled Tribes?
Question 3?
What is the purposive/objective interpretation, and does it require reading Section 3(A) harmoniously with the Regulation's preamble and other provisions?
DIPAK MISRA, J.
( 1 ) IN this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner calls in question the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Sundargarh (opposite party No. 2) in Revenue Appeal No. 1 of 1991 under Section 3 (3) of Regulation 2/1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulation') reversing the order passed by the Sub-Collector, Sundargarh in Revenue Misc. Case No. 24 of 1984 whereby the original authority had directed for restoration of possession to the present petitioner.
( 2 ) THE essential facts which are necessary for disposal of the writ application may be stated thus :-The present petitioner, Jogeswar Majhi instituted Revenue Misc. Case No. 24 of 1984 before the Sub-Collector, Sundargarh claiming restoration of possession from one Ramia Kishan @ Lakra, opposite party No. 1, in the present writ application. A show cause was filed by the opposite party therein indicating that he had not purchased the suit land situated at village Korgaon, Khata No. 150 and Plot Nos. 702 and 703. A report was called for through the Revenue Inspector. On the date of hearing the opposite party was absent and the Sub-Collector on perusal of the report of the Revenue Inspector and the show cause filed by the opposite party allowed the application and directed the Tahasildar to restore possession to the petitioner therein. The opposite party, Ramia Kishan preferred Revenue Appeal No. 1/91 before the Addl. District Magistrate, under Section 3 (3) of the Regulation. The appellant therein contended that the Sub-Collector had passed an absolute cryptic order without discussing the relevant law in the field and properly appreciating the tenor of the show cause submitted by him. It was also canvassed before the appellate authority that Sections 3 and 3 (A) of the Regulations are not applicable if both the parties belong to the Schedule Tribe. The other submission which was putforth before the appellate forum is that the appellant had perfected title by way of adverse possession. The appellate authority came to hold that neither Section 3 nor Section 3 (A) was applicable and the application filed before the Sub-Collector was misconceived. He further held that the appellant therein had not perfected his title by way of adverse possession. He also arrived at the conclusion that the order passed by the Subcollector was cryptic, and adequate opportunity had not been afforded to the contesting party to substantiate his claim. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis he allowed the appeal and directed that possession should be given back to the appellant as the same had already been taken in pursuance of the order passed by the Sub-Collector as reflected in the report dated 28-11-90 submitted by the Revenue Inspector, Kutra. The said order is the cause of grievance of the present petitioner.
( 3 ) A counter-affidavit has been filed by the Sub-Collector who has supported the order passed by him.
( 4 ) MR. B. P. Ray, the learned counsel for the petitioner assailing the order passed by the appellate authority contended that the interpretation given by the appellate authority with regard to the word 'person' occurring in Section 3 (A) of the Regulation is not correct as the meaning of the term 'person' cannot be confined to the Schedule Tribe persons alone. He has further submitted that such a narrow construction would defeat the object and purpose of the Regulation. With regard to grant of opportunity and crypticness of the order passed by the Sub-Collector, the learned counsel submitted that as opposite party No. 1 chose to remain absent on calls no fault should be found with the Sub-Collector in proceeding to determine the controversy.
( 5 ) MR. J. Behera, learned Additional Government Advocate supports the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate and contends that the meaning of the word 'person' in Section 3 (A) has to be read in harmony with the other provisions of the Regulation
