A Muslim husband is liable to pay maintenance to his wife under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, even if he has divorced her, unless he has complied with the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

P. K. TRIPATHY, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') with a prayer to quash the order of maintenance passed by the S. D. J. M. , Cuttack against him under Section 125 of the Code vide order dated 12-12-1989 in Criminal Misc. Case No. 94 of 1988 which was confirmed by the First Addl. Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Revision No. 7 of 1990 vide order dated 19-3-1993.

( 2 ) OPPOSITE party No. 1 herself and for her minor sons opposite parties 2 and 3 claimed maintenance from the petitioner who is her husband and father of opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 on the ground of negligence, cruelty and desertion. In his written statement petitioner admitted the relationship but denied the allegations of negligence, cruelty and desertion. At the stage of tendring evidence the petitioner made a statement that he had divorced the opposite party No. 1 learned S. D. J. M. recorded a finding that the plea of divorce was not proved and that opposite party No. 1 proved the factum of negligence, cruelty and desertion. Accordingly, he awarded monthly maintenance of Rs. 200/- to the opposite party No. 1 and Rs. 100/- to each of opposite parties 2 and 3 from the date of application i. e. 5-4-1988. In Criminal Revision No. 7 of 1990 learned First Addl. Sessions Judge, Cuttack on assessment of the evidence confirmed the findings of the S. D. J. M. and dismissed the revision.

( 3 ) IN the petition under Section 482 of the Code though the orders of the lower Courts are challenged both in respect of the decision on the issue of divorce as well as on the issue of negligence, cruelty and desertion and the grant of maintenance thereof, yet at the time of arguments Mr. S. K. Aziz, learned Counsel for the petitioner confined his argument only with respect to the issue on divorce. Hence, the other grounds raised in the petition are treated as not pressed. Mr. Aziz argued that the parties are Muslim and are governed by their personal law. In a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code the petitioner (opposite party herein) has to comply with mandatory provisions under Muslim Women (Protection of Rights and Divorce) Act, 1986 (in short, 'the Act' ). He further argued that keeping in view the settled legal position the courts below should have accepted that the plea of divorce has been substantiated at least from the date of evidence if not from the date on which the divorce took place in 1988. He thus prayed to quash the order by exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code.

( 4 ) MR. P. K. Sahu, learned cousnel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, argued that the argument of the petitioner is not tenable when in the written statement he has admitted the relationship. He further argued that petitioner has miserably failed to prove the factum of divorce and in that connection he supported the reasonings and the findings recorded by the courts below. Above all, he argued that, this proceeding under Section 482 of the Code is in disguise a second revision which is not permissible in view of the provisions under Section 397 (2) of the Code and that there being no illegality committed by the courts below nor there being any abuse of process of court this Court should not invoke inherent power so as to quash the impugned orders.

( 5 ) THE question of lack of jurisdictioin being of vital importance is being dealt with first.

( 6 ) A plain reading of Section 482 of the Code makes it clear that inherent power under that provision can be invoked by the High Court (i) to give effect to any order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or (iii) to secure the ends of justice, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Code. This provision corresponds to Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. By virtue of the said provision indeed a wide discretion has been vested with the High Court which is to be s