A court has the discretion to initiate a preliminary enquiry under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but it should do so only if it is in the interest of public justice and there is a reasonable probability of a conviction resulting from the complaint.

A. PASAYAT, C. J.

( 1 ) REFUSAL by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench (in short, the 'tribunal') to initiate a proceeding under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the 'code') has led to filing of this appeal, Appellant prayed before the Tribunal to initiate a suo motu preliminary enquiry under Section 340 of the Code relating to the alleged offence of perjury committed by the respondents by filing their reply dated 27-11-1996 along with letters dated 14-8-1996, 23-8-1996 and 10-10-1996 before the Tribunal in O. A. No. 499 of 1996 which contained false statements and referred to forged and non-existent document. Grievance is that in O. A. No. 499 of 1996 pending before the Tribunal, respondents have stated in their counter that the notification dated 2-3-1965 relied upon by the applicant in that case is non-existent and the correct circular dated 2-3-1965 has been enclosed to the counter. According to the respondents the correct circular dated 2-3-1965 deals with giving preference to handicapped persons in Government employment whereas the case of the applicant in the original application is that the circular dated 2-3-1965 is for giving preference to cured leprosy patients. Applicant's case is that there is another circular for cured leprosy patients issued on the same day, i. e. , 2-3-1963, and therefore, the respondents have deliberately misled the Court, and are prima facie guilty of criminal contempt. Three contempt petitions were filed before the Tribunal and they were dismissed. Against the order dated 3-4-1997 dismissing the contempt petition filed by one Sk. Apsaruddin, the petitioner went to the Supreme Court in S. L. P. No. (Criminal) No. 1498 of 1997 and the Supreme Court by order dated 2-3-1998 on a perusal of the record held that no cause is made out for initiation of contempt proceeding. On the same issue some other persons went to the Principal Bench in O. A. No. 2494 of 1992 and by order dated 17-12-1997 it was held that by issuing the letter dated 27-11-1996 saying that the two notifications of 1971 and 1981 were non-existent, the respondents could not be said to have committed any contempt. In case the said notifications were in force or could be enforced, the applicant would be free to urge the same at the time of argument. It was further held that no case of criminal contempt against the respondents was made out. It was observed that if the allegations are true, same may amount to perjury punishable under Section 193 or Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'ipc'), but it would not make out a case of criminal contempt. Basing on the aforesaid observation that the allegations, if true, may amount to perjury, the applicant filed an application before the Tribunal for holding a suo motu enquiry under Section 340 of the Code. Tribunal did not accept the prayer. It was held that at that stage it would not be proper to initiate such enquiry. It was observed as follows :". . . As earlier noted, O. A. No. 499/96 is pending before the Tribunal and the petitioners would be free to argue, at the time of hearing of the case, if there is a circular dated 2-3-1965 giving preference in employment to cured leprosy patients. It is only after this position is established that the question of initiating, if at all, any action for prosecution of the respondents for perjury under Section 340, Cr. P. C. read with Section 195, IPC would arise. At present, we hold that there is no case for holding on enquiry into the alleged commission of offence of perjury by the respondents. The observation of the Principal Bench is not a decision or finding that perjury has in fact been committed. We, therefore, hold that the petition is without any merit and the case is rejected. "

( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for appellant submitted that the Tribunal has misconceive the scope and ambit of Section 340 of the Code. Even at an interim stage, the provisions have application. Respondents have r