THE GRANT OF SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE DOES NOT DECIDE THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES TO THE BANK ACCOUNT IN QUESTION AND IS MORE OR LESS BY WAY OF AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT.

P. K. MISRA, J.

( 1 ) THE present opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 filed application under S. 372 of the Indian Succession Act for grant of Succession Certificate after the death of deceased Nabaghana Khatun. The opposite parties 1 and 2 claim that, being the son of the predeceased sister of the deceased Nabaghana, they are the legal heirs and entitled to withdraw the Bank deposits indicated in their petition. Objection was filed by the present petitioners. It was claimed by them that the present petitioner No. 1 was the adopted son of Nabaghana. The matter was disposed of by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) by refusing to issue Succession Certificate and by directing the parties to file appropriate suit for establishing their right, if any. The present opposite parties 1 and 2 filed Misc. Appealno. 143 of 1994, which has been allowed by the Addl. District Judge, Cuttack, who has directed that the Succession Certificate should be granted in favour of the present opposite parties 1 and 2 subject to execution of security to the tune of Rs. 60,000/ -. The said order is under challenge in this Revision.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, vehemently contended that the appellate Court has reversed the order of the Trial Court and granted Succession Certificate in favour of opposite parties No. 1 and 2, without considering the materials properly and without any reasonable basis. It is further contended that the Succession Certificate could not have been granted in favour of one person, and grant of Succession Certificate jointly in favour of opposite parties 1 and 2 is improper.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting opposite parties 1 and 2, has supported the order passed by the lower Appellate Court.

( 4 ) ON perusal of the impugned order of the lower appellate Court, it appears that, the lower appellate Court has dealt with the matter in lackadaisical fashion without considering the various materials on record. There is some justification in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the appellate Court has mechanically passed order without properly considering the reasonings given by the trial Court and without considering the material evidence on record. However, that by itself is not sufficient ground to interfere with the order passed by the lower appellate Court. The present Revision is evidently filed under S. 115, C. P. C. Section 115 (1), C. P. C. which is relevant for the present purpose, is as follows :-115. Revision.- (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit :provided that the High Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where- (a) xx xx xx (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.

( 5 ) KEEPING in view the object of civil revisional jurisdiction, and particularly keeping in view the proviso (b), though it can be said that the order has been passed with material irregularity, it cannot be said that this is a fit case that High Court should interfere in a Civil Revision. Proviso (b) (2) of S. 115 clearly envisages that the High Court shall not interfere under S. 115, C. P. C. and vary or reverse any order made except where the High Court is satisfied that the impugned order if allowed to stand, shall occasion failure of justice or would cause irreparable injury to the aggrieved person.

( 6 ) IN the present case, the