The main legal point established is that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should not be construed in a hair-split manner, and the provision regarding termination of tenancy by issuing notice must not be converted to a booby trap by finding inconsequential mistakes.

P. K. MISRA, J.

( 1 ) DEFENDANT is the appellant against an affirming decision.

( 2 ) PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS had filed a suit for eviction of the defendant from the disputed shop room and for realisation of arrear house rent and damages. There is no dispute that the disputed shop room belongs to the plaintiffs which had been let out to the defendants - a Cooperative Society. An unregistered lease deed was executed stipulating that lease was granted for a period of five years from 1-3-1984 to 28-2-1989 and the monthly rent had been fixed at Rs. 900/ -. Notice was issued to the defendant to vacate the shop room by end of Sept. 1989. Thereafter the suit was filed for eviction and realisation of Rs. 7,200/- towards arrear rent.

( 3 ) THE defendant in its written statement challenged the maintainability of the suit on the ground that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid and defective. It was further indicated that the defendant had not been properly represented through its Managing Director as required under the bye-laws. It was also pleaded that without notice under Section 126 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, the suit was not maintainable.

( 4 ) BOTH the courts below found that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been validly issued and accordingly decreed the suit.

( 5 ) IN this appeal, it is contended that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid as there was no indication that tenancy was being terminated. It is also submitted that the plaintiffs having accepted rent, it must be taken there has been waiver of notice and the tenancy continued.

( 6 ) LAW is now well settled that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should not be construed in a hair-split manner so as to find out loop-holes in such notice. The provision regarding termination of tenancy by issuing notice under Section 106 must not be converted to a booby trap by finding out inconsequential mistakes in such notice. From the notice it must be apparent that the landlord wants to terminate the tenancy and the minimum period of such notice has been complied with. In the present case, though the lease was for a period of five years since the lease was not registered, it must be taken that a monthly tenancy had been created and as such fifteen clear days, notice was required to be given. Ext. 4, the notice which was issued on 9-9-1989, called upon the defendant to give vacant possession by end of the last day of the motnh of Sept. 1989. It further stated that unless the defendant vacated the shop room the plaintiffs would take legal proceedings against the defendant for its eviction and for recovery of arrear rent. Thus, even though it was not specifically mentioned that the "tenancy was determined", it is evident that the plaintiffs wanted to determine the tenancy by giving notice. It is also apparent that more than fifteen clear days' notice had been given. Therefore, it cannot be said that the notice was not in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, the tenancy had been validly terminated.

( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that it must be taken that there was waiver of notice as subsequently, the amount was received. The question relating to waiver of notice being a mixedquestion of fact and law cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in Second Appeal. Even though amount had been received, the circumstances under which such amount had been received are not available on record. In the absence of specific plea, such a question cannot be entertained. Moreover, no such contention having been raised before the lower appellate Court, it would not be proper to accept such submission made for the first time in the present appeal. In such view of the matter, the decrees passed by the Courts below must be confirmed.

( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant stated that the shop roo