The main legal point established in the judgment is that there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one's own religion, and the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact laws in the interests of maintaining public order.

P. K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

( 1 ) THIS writ petition is filed by two gentlemen said to be on behalf of the Christian Community. They seek to challenge the constitutional validity and legality of the provisions in Section 2 of the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 and Rules 4 and 5 of the Orissa Freedom of Religion Rules, 1989 and the Rules inserted as Rules 2 and 3 by the Orissa Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Rules, 1999.

( 2 ) THE Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act') was enacted by the State Legislature under Entry I, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The validity of that enactment and the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact that law came to be challenged before this Court. This Court, by the decision in Mrs. Yulitha Hyde v. State of Orissa, AIR 1973 Orissa 116, held that the enactment was outside the legislative competence of the State Legislature and Entry I in List II or List III did not authorise the impugned legislation and that the legislation came within Entry 97, List I of the Seventh Schedule. This Court further held that Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of India guaranteed freedom of propagation of religion and conversion as a part of the Christian Religion. This decision was appealed against before the Supreme Court by the State of Orissa. A Constitution Bench, by the decision in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 908, reversed the decision of this Court. The Supreme Court held that the legislation was one under Entry I, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and was hence legislatively competent. The Supreme Court further held that there was no fundamental right in any one to convert another person to one's own religion and that the freedom of religion and the right to propagate one's religion protected by Art. 25 of the Constitution of India did not include the right to convert another to one's own religion.

( 3 ) IT is in this background that the question whether any of the other rights of the petitioners herein have been violated has to be considered. But, at the threshold, it appears to us that the challenge by the petitioner's insofar as it relates to Section 2 of the Act, is clearly concluded against them by the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above. That apart, the petitioners herein are not persons who want to get themselves converted into any religion and the Act and the Rules stand in their way. They are persons who want to convert others into their religion. Their contention that their right under Article 25 of the Constitution of India is violated clearly stands rejected by the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above. As we have noticed, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the right to convert another person to one's own religion was not covered by Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of India and there was no fundamental right in any one to convert another person to one's own religion. The argument that no legislation like the one is possible under cover of Article 25 (2) of the Constitution raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot also be accepted since in the above decision, the Supreme Court has very clearly held that the Legislature was competent to enact the law in the interests of maintaining public order covered by Entry I, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution or India. Therefore, the arguments based on the observations in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 and Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388 do not enable the petitioners to establish that they have a fundamental right to convert and that right is part of the right guaranteed by Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of India.

( 4 ) IN this context, we posed the question whether the petitioners could complain, that any of their rights have been violated