The main legal point established is that the necessity of notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act depends on the expiry of the lease period and the tenant's status, as provided in Sections 111(a) and 116 of the T. P. Act.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 15-9-2005 and 29-9-2005 respectively passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack in rfa No. 132 of 2004 confirming the judgment dated 21 -9-2004 passed by the learned civil Judge (Junior Division), Second Court, cuttack in Title Suit No. 164 of 2001.

( 2 ) THE present respondent, as plalntiff, filed the above noted suit for eviction of the present appellant from the suit house and for recovery of arrear rent. The plaintiffs case in essence is that the defendant was inducted as a tenant in the suit house as monthly tenant on the basis of the agreement dated 24-4-1969, but even after ex-piry of the period of tenancy contemplated in the agreement, defendant did not give vacant possession of the house for which a notice wilder Section 106 of the T. P. Act was served and the suit for eviction and arrear rent was filed. Defendant in his written statement took the plea that the lease agreement dated 24-4-1969 was for a period of 60 years and accordingly, he is running a mill on the premises and therefore, the period of lease has not expired. He took a further plea that statutory notice under Section 106 of the t. P. Act was not served on him and therefore, the suit for eviction was not maintainable. The learned trial Court framed four issues and on consideration of the evidence produced by the parties, came to hold that the period of tenancy as per the agreement was for 10 years and the said period has expired, that the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was served on the defendant and accordingly decreed the suit for the plalntiff. The defendant challenging the said judgment and decree carried the matter before the learned District Judge, Cuttack in the above noted appeal. The said appeal having been dismissed and the findings of the learned trial Court having been confirmed, the present appeal has been filed.

( 3 ) THE following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration in this appeal.

(i) Whether the Courts below are justified in holding that the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act terminating the tenancy of the defendant is not necessary in the present case? (ii) When the tenancy was started on 24-4-1969 and notice under Section 106 of the t. P. Act was issued on 11-12-1997 terminating the tenancy with effect from 31-12-1997, whether the notice was a valid one as per the provisions of Section 106 of the T. P. Act?

( 4 ) MR. D. P. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant submits that when the appellant is continuing in possession of the suit premises, even after expiry of the period of tenancy, he continues to be a tenant by holding over as per the provisions of Section 116 of the T. P. Act and therefore, notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was mandatory. He states that no notice under section 106 of the T. P. Act having been served, the suit for eviction was not maintainable. He cites the cases of Satish Ch. Makhan and others v. Govardhan Das Byas and others, AIR 1984 SC 143 in support of his continuation.

( 5 ) MR. S. Samantaray, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand submits that in view of Section 111 of the T. P. Act, once the period of tenancy expires, the tenant is liable for eviction and no notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act is necessary. He submits that even if no notice is necessary in the present case, service of notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act on the defendant-appellant was clearly proved and therefore, the Courts below had every justification of saying that the suit was maintainable and not hit under Section 106 of the T. P. Act. He cites the cases of Shanti prasad Devi and another v. Shankar Mahto and others, AIR 2005 SC 2905 and A. Rajeswari v. Brundaban Mohapatra, 94 (2002) CLT 212 : AIR 2003 (NOC) 104 (Ori. ).

( 6 ) BEFORE delving into the merit of the rival contentions of learned counsel for both the parties, it will be appropriate to quote the relevant provisions of