B. K. SEHERA, J.

( 1 ) THE order of conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code with the sentence to undergo imprisonment for life has been recorded by the trial court against the appellant on the basis of the evidence of a solitary eye-witness (P. W. 2) coupled with the act of absconding by the appellant soon after the occurrence, after accepting the case of the prosecution that the appellant, having borne a grudge against Hadu Nabak (to be described hereinafter as the deceased) suspecting that he had played witch-craft and had killed his two ailing sons,. killed the deceased in the early hours of November 28, 1978, at village Karapada in the district of Ganjam by stabbing him by means of a Kali while the deceased was coming out of the tea shop of Indramani Raul (P. W. 3) near that of P. W. 2 and then took to his heels and absconded until December 16. 1978, before his surrender and arrest at the Chatrapur Police Station on that day.

( 2 ) THE finding that the deceased died a homicidal death has not been assailed. While Mr. Bohidar has urged on behalf of the appellant that no order of conviction could be based on the highly interested and untrustworthy evidence of P. W. 2 which had not been corroborated with regard to the complicity of the appellant and in the absence of other evidence pointing to his guilt, the allegation of absconding, even if accepted although it should not have been, would not lead to the conclusion of a guilty mind. Mr. Indrajit Ray, the learned Additional Government Advocate, has pressed for acceptance of the evidence of P. W. 2 as had been done by the court of trial as it is worthy of credence. He has, however, submitted that if the evidence of P. W. 2 is not accepted by this Court, the fact of absconding is of no consequence.

( 3 ) THE fact of absconding of an accused person, by itself, would not lead to the proof of commission of a crime. Absconding, by itself, would not lead to a conclusion of a guilty mind. Even an innocent person may feel panicky and run away to avoid arrest when falsely suspected of a grave crime. Such is the instinct of self-preservation.

( 4 ) THERE was no acceptable evidence that the appellant had borne a grudge because two of his sons had died at the hands of the deceased by playing witch craft on them.

( 5 ) TO bring home the charge, the prosecution had examined P. Ws. 2 to 6 and 9 as witnesses to the occurrence. Of them, only P. W. 2, the nephew of the deceased, had testified regarding the complicity of the appellant. The other witnesses did not support the case of the prosecution and had been put leading questions by it under section 154 of the Evidence Act and had been confronted with some statements implicating the appellant as the author of the crime said to have been made by them in the course of investigation and recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which they had disowned.

( 6 ) WHEN a witness is neither an accomplice nor a person analogous to an accomplice, but is an ordinary witness, the Court may, as a general rule, act on the testimony of such a solitary witness without corroboration unless the circumstances of a particular case necessitate it. Ramratan and Qthers v. State ofrajasthan. The order of conviction cn be based on the evidence of a solitary witness if such evidence is true and trustworthy and is above reproach. To carry conviction, such evidence should be of an unimpeachable character.

( 7 ) THE evidence of P. W. 2 was that of a relation of the deceased. The evidence of a witness is not to be rejected merely on the ground of his relationship with the deceased, but such evidence is to be scrutinised with care. (See Ravupalli Kondaah and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh2 and ctt rif V P c irch iic (hh,n nri rithrc Pri irinr rpni iirpc c hc hn rihcrwh in 4 Ramji Surjya and another v. State of Maharashtra , that some corroboration should be sought from the other prosecution evidence in support of the testimony of a