JUDGMENT

L. MOHAPATRA, J. — This revision is directed against the order dated 05.04.2003 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubanes¬war in I.C.C. No. 120 of 1992 rejecting the petition for com¬pounding the offence.

2. It appears from the record that opposite party No.2 has filed the complaint alleging commission offences under Sections 294, 323, 506, 379 of the Penal Code by the present petitioner. During the course of hearing of the complaint, a joint petition was filed for compounding the offences. The learned Magistrate in the impugned order observed that Sections 294 and 506 of the Penal Code are not compoundable and so far as Section 379 of the Penal is concerned, since the subject matter of theft exceeds Rs. 250/-, the same is also not compoundable and accordingly in the impugned order the learned Magistrate compounded the offence under Section 323 of the Penal Code, but refused to compound in respect of rest of the offences i.e. Sections 294, 379 and 506 of the Penal Code.

3. The learned counsel Shri Ray appearing for the peti¬tioner challenged the order on two grounds. According to Shri Ray, at the time of framing of charge the learned Magistrate by order dated 07.7.1994 had framed charge for commission of of¬fences under Sections 294, 323, 506 and 379 of the Penal Code. There cannot be any alteration of charge while considering an application for compounding the offences. According to Shri Ray, the learned Magistrate committed illegality in framing charge under Section 506 (ii) of the Penal Code while considering the application for compounding the offences. The other ground taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another reported in 2003 (3) Supreme 227 compounding is permissible in non-compoundable offences by the High Court in appropriate cases in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The Apex Court has observed that in exer¬cise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. the High Court can quash the proceeding in appropriate case where the parties approach for compounding the offence even in a non-compoundable offence.

4. So far as the first point concerned, on perusal of the order dated 7.7.1994 it appears that charge was framed for com¬mission of offences under Sections 294, 323, 506, and 379 of the Penal Code. In the impugned order, the learned Magistrate though has taken note of the same, at the same time has also observed that the offence alleged and charge framed is one under Section 506 (ii) of the Penal Code. If observation of the learned Magis¬trate to that extent is a mistake, the same can be rectified, but if the same has been done deliberately, an illegality has been committed by the learned Magistrate by altering the charge. There is scope for the Court at that stage to alter the charge. I accordingly, agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the offence is under Section 506 of the Penal Code and not under Section 506 (ii).

5. So far as the second point is concerned, the Apex Court in the decision referred to has observed as follows :

“ There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the par¬ties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a Court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their young days in chasing their cases in different Courts. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlaw¬ful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and w