JUDGMENT

A. S. NAIDU, J. — On the basis of a complaint petition filed by the opposite party on 5.2.1996 I.I.C. No.45 of 1996 was registered in the Court of S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar. In the said complaint petition it was, inter alia, alleged that the petition¬er, who was an Officer of the Police Department had committed offences punishable under Sections 161/294/323/506 of the I.P.C. Learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar by order dated 8.8.1997, on being prima facie satisfied that materials are available, took cogni¬zance of the offences under Sections 294 and 323 of the I.P.C. only. The said order is assailed before this Court invoking inherent jurisdiction mainly on the ground that the case had become barred by limitation as on 8.8.97 and as such the order taking cognizance was hit by Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is liable to be quashed. It was also contended that the allegations levelled were false and frivolous and the complaint petition was filed with an avowed oblique motive of harassing the petitioner. Admittedly, as would be evident from the complaint petition, the alleged occurrence took place on 2.2.96 and the complaint petition was filed on 5.2.1996. But then cognizance of offences under Sections 294 and 323 of the I.P.C. was taken only 8.8.97, i.e., after lapse of more than one year from the date of alleged commission of the offences.

2. Mr. Bijan Ray, learned Senior Advocate, relying upon Section 468 of the C.P.C, forcefully submitted that the Magis¬trate lacked authority to take cognizance of the offences under Sections 294 and 323 of the I.P.C. after expiry of the period of limitation, i.e. one year. It is further submitted that taking cognizance of offences after period of limitation, without condo¬nation of delay was illegal and it is a fit case where the order impugned cannot be sustained and as such the same may be quashed. In support of the aforesaid submission, Mr. Ray has relied upon a number of decisions, but then as there is no quarrel with regard to the legal proposition, there is no necessity of citing all the decisions at this stage.

3. Mr. G. Rath, learned counsel appearing for the com¬plainant-opp.party, at the other hand, while not disputing the fact, that the order of cognizance was taken after the period of limitation, forcefully submitted that the basic objective of introducing the provisions for limitation for taking cognizance of different offences is meant to protect a person from being har¬assed by any vexatious allegations/cases. According to him in the present case the complaint petition was filed with utmost promp¬titude within the period of limitation. Therefore, the delay in taking cognizance would not be fatal to the case and the Court below on being prima facie satisfied that there were materials with regard to commission of the offences has rightly taken cognizance of offences under Sections 294 and 323 of the I.P.C. According to Mr. Rath, the order is just, legal and suffers from no infirmity and as such the same may not be interfered with. He has relied upon the decision of Patna High Court in the case of Ram Kripal Prasad and others v. The State of Bihar and others reported in AIR 1986 PATNA 254 in support of such submission.

4. It is well settled that the object of Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecution was to prevent litigants from filing vexatious complaint cases or petitions or F.I.Rs. after long lapse of time. There is no dispute that by efflux of time material evidence may disappear and it would be really tough for a person to defend himself by adducing suitable evidence. This object is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Consti¬tution of India. It should, therefore, be kept in mind that any prosecution whether by the State or private complainant must abide by law in letter and spirit or take the risk of rejection on the ground of limitation.

5. In the Code of Criminal Pro