JUDGMENT

M. M. DAS, J. — The Insurer is the appellant in this appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The compensation amount awarded by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation-cum-Deputy Labour Commissioner, Central Division, Cuttack in W.C. Case No.35-D/2001 by judgment dated 26.2.2003 as has been deposited by the insurer, before the said Commissioner, as per the proviso to Section 30 of the Act.

2. The case of the workman in the aforementioned W.C. case was that, the deceased Laxmi Narayan Dubey, in course of employ¬ment under respondent No.4 as a driver of the truck bearing registration No. OR-04-6755, met with an accident when he parked the above truck near Chandikhol on N.H. 5 and was going to answer the call of nature. The offending vehicle was a tuck which came in a high speed and ran over the deceased Laxmi Narayan Dubey. As a result, the deceased succumbed to the injury, on the spot. Post-mortem was conducted on the body of the deceased at Jajpur Dis¬trict Hospital and P.S. Case No. 170 dated 26.11.2000 was regis¬tered in Barchana P.S. The respondents 1 to 3, as legal heirs and dependants of the deceased, filed the above mentioned W.C. Case before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, inter alia, pleading that the deceased was getting a monthly salary of Rs. 3000/- excluding fooding allowance of Rs. 20/- per day and was 46 years of age at the time of accident. Respondent No. 4, who was the owner of the truck and the employer of the deceased, appeared in the Court below and admitted the fact regarding the accident, employment and death of the deceased in course of employment. The appellant was the insurer of the above truck in which deceased was employed as a driver.

3. Mr. A. K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the above appeal involves a substantial question of law as envisaged u/s 30 of the Act and the said question of law is that the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation has committed an error of record in recording a finding that the deceased was aged 46 years at the time of death. Mr. Mohanty filed the certi¬fied copy of the deposition of P.W. 1, the wife of the deceased, before this Court and on perusal of the said deposition it tran¬spires that P.W.1 was asked in Cross-examination regarding the age of her daughter, the year of her daughter’s marriage, the year of her daughter’s birth and her age at the time of her marriage with the deceased, and her answer clearly shows on simple calculation that the age of the deceased at the time of accident was 49 years.

4. Shri Samantray, learned Advocate for the respondent-claimants, submitted that the above question does not amount to a substantial question of law as envisaged under Section 30 of the Act, since the same relates to appreciation of evidence. He relied upon some decided cases in support of his plea that the above question raised by the appellant is a question of fact and not a question of law. However, the said decisions cited by Shri Samantray were in reference to Section 100, C.P.C. and interpre¬tation of the clause “substantial question of law” was with reference to Section 100, C.P.C. and not Section 30 of the Act.

5. I am unable to accept the submission that the words “substantial question of law” in Section 30(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act must be given the same meaning as in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 100 of that Code makes provision for appeals from decrees and final orders of a Court which is a final appellate Court. Section 30 of the Act, on the other hand, makes provision for an appeal to this Court from a Tribunal of first instance and if the learned counsel’s submis¬sion be accepted, it follows that this Court will have no juris¬diction in a case in which the Commission had arrived at an obviously wrong conclusion on mis-construction of material evi¬dence available on record.

6. In my opinion, therefore, the phrase “substantia