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1971 Supreme(Ori) 73

ORISSA HIGH COURT
R.N Misra, J.
BATAKRUSHNA NAIK
VERSUS
KHAGESWAR KUNDA AND OTHERS
Criminal Revn. No. 399 of 1971 (From order passed by R. N. Das, Magistrate, 1st Class (Executive), Kendrapara,)
Decided on : 13-7-1971, December 1, 1972.

The date of possession in a dispute under Sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be determined based on the date of the preliminary order under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. Additionally, local inspection should be conducted within its limitations to avoid bias and influence on the case.

Headnote:

Sec. 145 - Criminal Procedure Code - Dispute over possession - The court determined the date of possession based on the date of the preliminary order under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. The court emphasized the limitations of local inspection and held that a magistrate should avoid making inquiries or gathering evidence during local inspection.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner challenged the final order in a proceeding under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the dispossession occurred more than two months prior to the preliminary order, and the magistrate overstepped the limit during local inspection.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the date of possession should be determined based on the date of the preliminary order under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. It also held that the magistrate's local inspection exceeded its limitations and influenced the final order, rendering it unsustainable.

Issues: The issues involved the determination of the date of possession and the validity of the magistrate's local inspection.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the date of possession should be based on the date of the preliminary order under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. It also highlighted the limitations of local inspection and the potential bias it introduces into the case.

Final Decision: The revision was allowed, and the case was directed to be heard by another magistrate due to concerns about the potential influence of the previous magistrate's local inspection.

ORDER

The second member of the second party is the petitioner. He assails the final order in the proceeding under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure terminating against him.

2. Two questions were raised by Mr. Dhal for the petitioner. Firstly, it is contended that a proceeding was initiated under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code by order dated 17-4-1970 at the instance of the first party who has succeeded. Therein while dispossession was admitted, the date of dispossession was not indicated. The proceeding was converted to one under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by order dated 13-5-1970. It is contended, therefore, that dispossession being more than two months prior to the preliminary order in the proceeding under sub-section (4) of Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Magistrate was obliged to find possession of the second party-petitioner.

3. Mr. Sinha does not agree that there has been admission of dispossession. It is not necessary to determine that dispute because in law the contention of Mr. Dhal cannot be supported. Admittedly on 17-4-1970, the matter came before the court and an order under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code was made. When the proceeding was converted into one under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and a preliminary order as required under the law was made, the date with reference to which possession has to be determined will be the date when the order under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code was made. For all material purposes the date of the preliminary order shall be taken to be the date when the prohibitory order was made under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. The alleged dispossession being less than two months from that date the point loses force.

4. The next contention is that the learned Magistrate who disposed of the proceeding visited the spot and as is indicated in his own order, he spoke to witnesses and witnesses also gave details of disputes before him. Certainly local inspection is not meant to be used for such purpose. Mr. Dhal seeks to rely upon a decision of Das, J., in this Court in the case of Daitari Patnaik v. Hadibandhu Singh, 1972 (2) Cut. WR 1309, wherein it has been observed that the Magistrates are not entitled to make local inspection. I do not endorse the view as such because it seems to be too well settled in this Court as also in series of decisions of other Courts that local inspection is permitted within its own limitations and where it is done for the purposes of appreciating the evidence already on record, objection is not taken. The decision of Das, J., therefore, would run counter to the law established in this Court and it is unnecessary to indicate further about the said decision. I am not inclined to refer this revision application to a larger bench for disposal because in the present case I am also not supporting a local inspection and its results. Even if the learned Magistrate was entitled to visit the spot, he was not entitled to make enquiries, gather evidence by talking to witnesses present at the spot, form an impression about the merit of the dispute and dispose of the dispute keeping these in view. Local inspection has its own limitations and if conducted within those limitations may not be objected to. It has often been said that when making local inspection the Magistrate should avoid making enquiries from the people on the spot as to the truth of the matter in dispute. (See AIR 1929 Lah. 120, Udho Ram v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Bom. 245, Mangru Feku, In re, AIR 1959 Manipur 38, Nijamuddin v. Abdulhei). In AIR 1964 Mys. 177, (Appayya Naika v. State of Mysore), where determination of the question of actual possession was largely influenced by extra-judicial information collected and observation made during local inspection was held to be vitiated. As was rightly indicated in a Nagpur decision, 39 Cri.L.J. 92 = (AIR 1937 Nag. 274), Deljit Singh v. Emperor, a Magistrate is entitled only to embody, in his in



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