Judgement

NARASIMHAM, J. :- These sis revision petitions are against the order of the District Munsif of Aska rejecting sis execution petitions Nos. 269, 271, 272, 273, 275 and 277 of 1944 on the ground that they were barred by limitation. The revision petitions were first heard by my Lord the Chief Justice sitting singly and he was pleased to refer to a larger Bench in view of the doubt entertained by him regarding the correctness of two Division Bench decisions of the Patna High Court reported in Banwari Narain v. Ramhari Narain, AIR (29) 1942 pat. 335 : (197 L.C. 217) and Mohammad Sadique Mian v. Mahabir Sao, AIR (29) 1942 Pat. 410 : (21 Pat. 366). 2. The material facts which ate not in dispute are as follows : Execution petn. No. 269 of 44 arose out of a Small Cause Court suit which was disposed of on 1st August 1944 and the remaining five execution petitions arose out of Small Cause Court salts which were disposed of on 8th August 1941. In all those suits, the decrees were actually drawn up and signed by the Munsif on 21st August 1941, and the decrees not only bore the dates on which the suits were disposed of (1st or 8th August as the case may be) but also the date on which they were actually signed (21st August 1941). The decree holder is the same in all the execution petitions which were filed on Slat August 1944. By virtue of Art. 182, Limitation Act, the execution petitions appear primes facie to be time-barred. But the decree holders main contention is that in all the six cases the decrees were formally drawn up and signed by the Court only on 21st August 1941 and that consequently limitation should ran from that date and not from the data which the decrees bear. The whole question therefore turns on the construction of the expression date of decree occurring in cl. (1) of Art. 182, Limitation Act. The lower Court relied on O. 20, R. 7, Civil P.C. and held that the expression date of decree meant the date which the decrees bore and that inasmuch as under the aforesaid provision of the Civil Procedure Coda the decree was required to bear the date of the judgment and not the date on which it was actually drawn up and signed, the former date alone should be taken to be the date of decree for the purpose of Art. 182, Limitation Act also.

3. The expression date of decree occurs in several provisions of the Civil Procedure Code such as Ss. 34, 48(1)(a), proviso (b) to S. 51, O. 21, R. 11(2)(c), O. 21, R. 22(1)(a) and O. 45, R. 7. Order 20, R. 7 runs as follows :

"Date of decree. - The decree shall bear data the day on which the judgment was pronounced and, when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment he shall sign the decree."

Though the expression date of decree has nowhere been defined is the ordinary way in the Civil Procedure Coda, there seems to be a unanimity amongst all the High Courts of India as well as the Privy Council that by virtue of, O. 20, R. 7 the date of decree means the date on which the judgment is pronounced and not the data on which the decree is formally drawn up and signed. In the Indian Limitation Act also, the expression date of decree occurs in several Articles such as Arts. 152, 156, 161, 162, 164, 169, 170, 173, 175 and 182 etc. and there is no definition of that expression. But almost all the High Courts seem to be unanimous that even in the Limitation Act the expression date of decree should be given the same meaning as indicated in O. 20, R. 7, Civil P.C. So far as Arts. 152, 156 and other Articles dealing with limitation for appeals, reviews, etc. were concerned, a direct decision of the question was not really necessary inasmuch as by relying on S 12, Limitation Act the interval between the date of judgment and the date of decree could always excluded. But for the purpose of Art. 182, however, S. 12, Limitation Act will be of no avail and our attention has not been invited to any decision of any High Court in India or of the Privy Cou