The period of limitation for a suit for contribution under Article 99 of the Limitation Act, 1908, begins to run from the date of payment made by the co-judgment debtor, and not from the date of the payment order passed by the court.

ORDER :- This is a defendants petition against the order of the Small Cause Court Judge. Aska, which raises an interesting question of law as to from what date the period of limitation will begin to run as provided under Art. 99 of the Limitation Act. The facts are rather simple. In T. S. No. 26 or 1950, the petitioners and the opposite party were the defendants. Admittedly defendants 1 to 4 were set down ex parte in that suit. But nevertheless a joint decree was passed against the petitioners and the opposite party. When execution of that decree was levied by the decree-holder, the opposite party Sukaru Panda paid the entire decretal dues. Accordingly he filed the present suit against the petitioners (S. C. C. Suit No. 217 of 1954 of the Court of the Munsif of Aska) for contribution. The trial Judge decreed the suit on contest against the petitioners and ex parts against defendant 2. Thus, the only question I am called upon to decide is whether or not the suit is barred by limitation.

2. Before I proceed to deal with the question of law, it would be necessary to state certain facts. The payment in the execution case admittedly was made by the opposite party to the process server on 23-9-51 while he went to serve certain processes. The payment order, however, in favour of the decree-holder, was passed on 19-10-51 and the present suit by the opposite party was filed on 10-10-54. The learned trial Judge held that, the time would begin to run from the date on which the payment was made to the decree-holder that is, 19-10-51 and accordingly he decreed the plaintiffs suit.

3. Mr. Murty, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner, contended that the whole suit is barred by limitation, since it was filed beyond three years from the date of the payment. The only Article that is applicable to such cases is Art. 99 of the Indian Limitation Act. It would be necessary at this stage, to quote the Article.

"99 For contribution by a party who has paid the whole or more than his share of the amount due under a joint decree or by a sharer in a joint estate who has paid the whole or more than his share of the amount of revenue due from himself and his co sharers Three years. The date of the payment in excess of the plaintiffs own share."

The other articles in the Limitation Act using similar expressions are, Arts. 61, 81, 82 and 107. In those articles as is evident, the terminus a quo is the date of payment. Now, Col. I of Art. 99 prescribes regarding a suit for contribution by a party who has paid the whole or more than his share of the amount due under a joint decree; Col. II provides the period of limitation and Col. III speaks about the date from which limitation will begin to run that is, the date of the payment in excess of the plaintiffs own share. There does not appear to have been many reported cases on this point. The only case of the nature that was brought to my notice is reported in Gahar Ali v. Abdul Owahab, AIR 1928 Cal 361 (A). The facts in that case were that a deposit was made by the plaintiff in Court on 4th February 1929, but the money was actually withdrawn by the decree-holders on 14th February, 1920. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the circumstances, held that where payment is made by a co-judgment-debtor in Court and the payment is appropriated toy Court in full satisfaction of decree, it is deemed to have accepted the payment on behalf of the decree-holder, it being looked upon as his agent or quasi agent, and, therefore, the limitation for a suit for contribution by such judgment-debtor against the other co-judgment-debtors begins to run from the date of acceptance of the deposit in Court. The criterion must always be whether or not the deposit made in excess of what is due by the person making the deposit did or did not remain under the control of the person making it. Therefore the question is when does the payer lose control of the money which he has paid either to Court or to one of its officers. In th