The principle of res judicata applies to execution proceedings and even an erroneous decision on the question of law operates as res judicata between the parties.

Judgement

NARASIMHAM, C.J. :- This is an appeal by a judgment-debtor against the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampur dated 17th September, 1954, over-ruling his objections under Sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, to the execution of a compromise decree in original Suit No. 51 of 1933. That suit was brought before the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampur by one Ghanashyam Deb claiming the Estate of Mandasa from one Jagannath Ramanuj Raj Deb who was alleged to be the adopted son of the previous Zamindar. The Estate was then included in the sub-division of Berhampur and was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampur (which was then a part of the Madras Presidency). When the Province of Orissa was formed with effect from 1st April 1936 Mandasa estate was separated from the Sub-division of Berhampur and included in the Sub-division of Chicacole in the Madras Presidency. As regards pending suits paragraph 20 of the Govt. of India (Constitution of Orissa) Order 1934, authorised the Governor-General in Council to issue appropriate directions. It reads as follows :

"20. Subject to the provisions of the last preceding paragraph, the Governor General in Council may after consulting the local Governments and High Courts concerned, give such direction as he thinks proper as to the disposal of any cases pending on or shortly before the appointed day, in any court acting for an area any part of which is transferred by this order to Orissa and as to the courts in which proceedings by way of appeal or revision are to lie in cases decided by any such courts before the appointed day. The directions referred to in the aforesaid paragraph were issued by the Governor-General in Council in Home Department Notification No. F 210/36 Judl. dated the 1st April 1936 and they were as follows :

"1. Every proceeding pending on the appointed day before any court other than a High Court, in or in respect of, any area transferred by the said Order to Orissa, shall be continued as if the said order had not been made.

2. Any appeal or application for revision in respect of any proceeding so pending or of any decision made before the appointed day in any such Court in or in respect of any such area shall lie in the court which has appellate or revisional jurisdiction as the case may be, over the Court which would have jurisdiction to try such proceeding if the proceeding were instituted after the appointed day;

Provided that where the proceeding relates to any property situate partly within and partly without any area so transferred by the said Order to Orissa, any appeal or application for revision shall lie as it the said order had not been made."

In pursuance of these directions the Subordinate Judge, Berhampur disposed of the suit on the 24th December 1936. An appeal against his decision was taken up before the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Appeal No. 355/37) but there, the parties entered into a compromise and a compromise decree was passed on the 14th February, 1941. The material terms of the compromise for the purpose of this litigation are contained in paragraph 4 of the decree which directed the respondent to pay to the appellant Rs. 75000/- in four instalments. The third instalment of Rs. 20,000/- was payable on or before the 3rd April 1942. The appellant-decree-holder assigned his rights to receive this instalment from the judgment-debtor to one Harihar Tripathy, predecessor in interest of the respondents in this appeal. Harihar Tripathy filed an execution case (E. P. No. 111 of 1942) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Berhampur, on the 18th July 1942 (See Ext. 2).

That application was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge on the 27th January, 1943 (Ext. 3) on the ground that as the Estate of Mandasa was transferred to Chicacole Sub-division of the Madras Presidency, the Berhampur Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree notwithstanding the fact that the suit was heard and disposed of by