The termination of service did not constitute retrenchment under Section 25F and did not violate Section 25G, thus the workman was not entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.

JUDGMENT :

S.N. Prasad, J.

The award dated 21.12.1991 passed in I.D. Case No. 36 of 1988 is under challenge whereby and where under, the reference has been answered in favour of the workman holding therein that the termination of service of the workman w.e.f. 10.11.1986 is neither legal nor justified and accordingly the workman has been held entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages.

2. Brief facts of the case of the workman is that he was appointed vide order No.6146 dated 24.8.1985 as substitute Conductor and subsequently he was appointed as per Order No.2400 dated 7.4.1984 allowed to continue till 22.2.1985. Again appointed vide order dated 14.6.1985, allowed to continue till 26.1.1987. On 24.1.1987 his service was terminated after expiry of the term and while doing so, no reasonable opportunity was given to him to explain the matter and no enquiry was held, hence action of the management is illegal and motivated.

3. While on the other hand, case of the management is that the workman was appointed as substitute Conductor, it was extended under various office orders till 10.11.1986. His service was terminated w.e.f. 10.11.1986 and the conductors who joined after him were transferred and they are still continuing in service. He has not been paid 15 days average pay and one month’s pay in lieu of one month prior notice to such termination of service. His retrenchment is not due to surplus staff. His juniors are still continuing in service and the management has not followed the procedure mentioned in Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such the termination is not sustainable and accordingly he is entitled to be reinstated with full back wages.

Further case of the management is that he workman was appointed temporarily as substitute Conductor for a period of 30 days vide office order dated 24.8.1985 in the suspension vacancy of Sri K.C. Sahu. His service was extended and he was adjusted in different leave and suspension vacancies from time to time. Ultimately his service was terminated w.e.f. 10.11.1986 on the report of checking staff on the allegation that he was carrying some adults and children passengers without ticket in Bus ORX-4403 on 11.9.1986. He was paid 15 days wages and one month pay towards retrenchment compensation. He was not appointed on regular vacancy and is not entitled to get the benefits under Section 25G of the I.D. Act, 1947.

4. The workman being aggrieved with the action of the management has raised a dispute which culminated into a reference having been made by the appropriate Government to the effect as follows:-

“Whether the termination of services of Sri Sarat Chandra Das a workman of M/s. OSRTC, Balasore w.e.f. 10.11.1986 by the District Transport Manager (A), Balasore is legal and/or justified? If not, to what relief is Sri Das is entitled?”

5. The Labour Court has answered the reference by holding therein that the termination of service of the workman is illegal and unjustified and directed to be reinstated in service with full back wages.

6. The Management being aggrieved with the award is before this Court by way of this writ petition on the ground that the finding is perverse as because the petitioner right from the first day of engagement was engaged under the leave vacancy for a period of 30 days and he was engaged time to time for the period of 30 days and as such he cannot be said to be an employee working under the regular establishment or he cannot be said to be rendered his service continuously for a period of 240 days.

The other ground has been taken that the provision of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is applicable for the reason that the petitioner was engaged under a contract for a specific period, hence termination of the workman is not coming under definition of Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act, but the Labour Court has not appreciated this aspect of the matter.

The further ground has been taken that the provision of Section 25G is not