The main legal point established in the judgment is the prohibition of unfair labor practices related to the engagement of workmen as 'badlis', casuals, or temporaries for years to deprive them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.

JUDGMENT :

K.R. MOHAPATRA, J.

The Management of Koraput Central Cooperative Bank, Jeypore has filed this writ petition assailing the award dated 07.11.2000 (Annexure-4) passed by learned Labour Court, Jeypore in ID Case No.9 of 2000 directing reinstatement of the Workman-opposite party No.2, namely, Bijay Kumar Dalai in service without any back wages.

2. Mr. Basanta Kumar Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted with vehemence that the Workman-opposite party No.2 was initially engaged by order dated 03.07.1996 (Annexure-1) as a Peon on daily wage basis for a period of 89 days. He was engaged to work as a domestic aid in the residence of the then President of the Management-Bank at Koraput. Pursuant to the order of engagement, the Workman joined in service on 04.07.1996. Before completion of 89 days, the Workman had made a request to give some engagement under the Management-Bank. Considering the necessity of work, the erstwhile President issued a fresh order of engagement on 03.10.1996. Likewise, the petitioner continued on 89 days basis till his services were terminated on 09.02.1998. It is the submission of Mr.Nayak that the nature of appointment of the Workman was purely temporary and for specific spells of 89 days only. The Workman-opposite party No.2 was never engaged for a continuous period of 240 days in a calendar year preceding his termination. He was being engaged as and when necessary. As such, the retrenchment of the Workman-opposite party No.2 is squarely covered under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘ID Act’). His engagement came to an end on expiration of the terms of engagement specified in engagement order. As there was no necessity for engagement of temporary worker after 02.09.1998, the Workman-opposite party No.2 was not given any fresh engagement. As such, Section 25-F of the ID Act was not required to be complied with while dispensing with services of the Workman. Learned Labour Court, without appreciating the same, most illegally held that the engagement of Workman-opposite party No.2 was continuous without any break for a period of more than one year, which is contrary to the evidence on record. Thus, the direction for reinstatement of the Workman in service cannot be sustained being contrary to the weight of evidence and provisions of law. He, therefore prayed for setting aside of Annexure-4.

3. Mr.L.Pangari, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr.B.Jena, learned counsel for the Workman-opposite party No.2 submitted that the opposite party No.2 was in continuous employment under the petitioner-Management till his termination on 02.09.1998. The Workman-opposite party No.2 was working as a Peon under the Management-Bank and the requirement of services of a Peon was perennial in nature. In order to avoid the rigorous of the provisions of the ID Act, the Workman was being given engagement on 89 days basis with artificial breaks. However, he was in continuous employment for more than 240 days in a calendar year preceding his date of termination, i.e., 02.09.1998. Judicial pronouncements have repeatedly deprecated the mode of temporary engagement with artificial breaks in service being adopted by Management to avoid compliance of mandatory provisions of ID Act. The Workman-opposite party No.2 was terminated from service without complying with provisions of Section 25F of the ID Act. As such, the impugned award cannot be faulted with.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record and on consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is taken up for final disposal at the stage of admission.

Ext.1 to Ext.6 relied upon by the Management-petitioner amply proved that the engagement of the Workman-opposite party No.2 was on 89 days spells. The Management-petitioner has annexed copy of some of the engagement orders to the writ petition (Annexure-1 to 3). On perusal of the engagement orders under Annexure-1 to 3 although suggest that the eng