The main legal point established in the judgment is the reliance on un-demolished eyewitness testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and the Investigating Officer's report, in establishing the intentional murder under Section 304-Part-1 IPC.

JUDGMENT :

BISWAJIT MOHANTY, J.

1. The appellant has preferred the present appeal challenging the judgment dated 14.5.2007 pronounced by the learned Sessions Judge, Keonjhar in Sessions Trial No.189 of 2006 convicting him under Section 304-Part-1 IPC. He has also challenged the sentence imposed on him whereby he has been directed to undergo R.I. for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo further R.I. for one month.

2. The allegation against the appellant is that on 2.9.2006 at 9.00 A.M., he intentionally committed murder of his sister-in-law-Hara Dehury. While the appellant is the eldest brother in the family, P.W.1 is the youngest brother in the family. The deceased Hara Dehury is the wife of the middle brother, namely, Tika. All the three brothers were staying together. The incident occurred on 2.9.2006. One day prior to the occurrence, the appellant took food at the house and started quarrelling with the deceased. On the date of occurrence, the appellant refused to take food and started quarrelling. He asked the deceased to trace out her husband, who had left the house to work in mines. In such background, the deceased left the house with a promise to search her husband. While she was going away, the appellant followed her with a tangia and assaulted her. Due to such assault, she fell down with bleeding injuries and expired. This incident was reported to the police and in due course after completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the appellant. Accordingly, the appellant was put to trial.

3. The plea of the appellant was of complete denial. Prosecution in order to bring home the charges examined as many as six witnesses and exhibited 17 documents.

4. P.W.1 is the youngest brother of the appellant and the deceased is his sister-in-law. He is an eye-witness to the occurrence. P.W.2 is the daughter of the deceased. P.W.3 is a relative of the appellant and is a witness to the inquest and various seizures including the seizure of the axe/tangia. P.W.4 is a co-villager. P.W.5 is the Investigating Officer and P.W.6 is the doctor, who conducted autopsy. From the side of the appellant, no evidence was adduced.

5. Mr. Radharaman Das Nayak, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the impugned judgment and the order imposing sentence are contrary to law and against the weight of evidence on record. He submitted that since the informant (P.W.1) in his cross-examination has admitted that he does not know the contents of F.I.R., the entire edifice of prosecution story collapses. Therefore, the present appeal ought to be allowed. Relying on the statement of P.W.1 in the cross-examination to the effect that “By the time I reached the spot Hara was lying on the ground”, he submitted that this makes it clear that P.W.1 was not an eye-witness to the occurrence. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 should not be given much weightage. The learned trial court has gone wrong in treating P.W.1 as an eyewitness. Further, he submitted that P.W.3 who is a witness to the seizure to the axe, in his cross-examination has deposed that he has not seen the blood on the axe nor does he know about the day and date of occurrence. This according to him throws doubt on the version of P.W.1 about use of axe and the entire incident. Lastly, he submitted that the doctor conducting autopsy, i.e., P.W.6 in his cross-examination has admitted that Injuries No.5 and 6 were not sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Such an admission by P.W.6 in his cross-examination runs contrary to his stand in the examination-in-chief. Such grave contradiction has been ignored by the learned court below. Rather on this account, the learned court below ought to have ignored the testimony of P.W.6. In such background, he submitted that the judgment of conviction be set aside and the appellant who is an illiterate tribal should be set at liberty.

6. Mr. L.Samantaray, learned Standing Counsel, on the contrary, defended the impugned