JUDGMENT :

VINEET SARAN, J.

The above noted misc. case has been filed for condonation of delay of 637 days in preferring Writ Appeal No. 171 of 2017, by which the judgment dated 21.08.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 22356 of 2010 has been challenged.

2. In the application for condonation of delay, the appellant-petitioner has pleaded as follows:

“1. That W.P(C) No. 22356/2010 was disposed of on 21.08.2015 by way of a judgment. The certified copy of the judgment was delivered on 08.10.2015 for which an application was made on 02.09.2015. However, the certified copy of the order was received in the Branch Secretariate of the Ministry on 24.02.2017 which was immediately sent to the FF Division, New-Delhi on the very same day. On 13.04.2017, the advice of Ministry of law & Justice, New-Delhi was received in the FF Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Branch Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Freedom Fighters Division, Kolkata received the advice of Ministry of Law & Justice on 01.05.2017 and on 03.05.2017, relevant documents were sent to Assistant Solicitor General of Government of India for High Court of Orissa for filling (sic) of writ appeal. In this process, there has been a delay of 621 days in preferring the appeal.

2. That the averments advanced in the writ appeal may be read as part of this Misc. Case.

3. That the delay in preferring the appeal is not intentional but was a product of situation since the certified copy of the judgment although was obtained on 08.10.2015 but the same could only come to the Branch Secretariate of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 24.02.2017.”

As is evident from the pleadings quoted above, the only explanation given by the appellant-petitioner is that the certified copy of the judgment dated 21.08.2015 was delivered on 08.10.2015 for which an application was made on 02.09.2015. Thereafter, all that has been stated is that the certified copy of the judgment was received by Branch Secretariat of the Ministry on 24.02.2017. Without explaining as to what happened during the intervening period of more than 16 months, the advice of the Ministry of Law and Justice is said to have been received on 13.04.2017. Then on 03.05.2017, the relevant documents were sent to the Additional Solicitor General for the Government of India for filing the appeal in the High Court. The appeal was then filed on 20.06.2017.

3. While construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired, the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.

4. As has been already stated, the reason ascribed justifying “sufficient cause” to condone the delay is nothing but bureaucratic movement of the file in the office. In Collector (LA) v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, the apex Court made a significant departure from the earlier judgments and observed:

“The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to app