The main legal point established in the judgment is that the intention of the accused in committing trespass must be determined by considering all the circumstances, including the natural consequences of the action.

JUDGMENT :

B.K. Patra, J. - The Petitioners had been convicted u/s 447, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 60/- each and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two weeks. Petitioner No. 1 had been further convicted u/s 323, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 30/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one week. During the pendency of this revision petition, Petitioner No. 1 died and his name was struck off.

2. The opposite party Gurubari Naik who was the complainant in the trial Court is the Ex.Choukidar of Mouza. Chhachina. It is the prosecution case that after the abolition of the choukidari system, the opposite party was given a lease by Government in respect of one acre of land out of Anabadi Plot No. 1633 of that village. Sometime in the year 1963 on 15.9.1965, when the opposite party and his sons were ploughing the land, the Petitioners are alleged to have gone over the land and obstructed them form ploughing the same. On the protest by the opposite party, the deceased Petitioner Krushna Bhuyan is alleged to have given him a push. The defence plea is a denial of the occurrence. According to the Petitioners, the disputed land is a gopher land of the village and has never been possessed or outvoted by the opposite party. It is not disputed that plot No. 1633 which, according to p.w. 5, has an area. of 5 to 7 adores is the Gochar land of the village. But the Courts below accepted the prosecution case that one acre out of this land was granted on lease to the complainant. On the further finding that on the date of occurrence, the Petitioners entered upon the land and prevented the complainant and his sons from ploughing it, they convicted the Petitioners u/s 447, Indian Penal Code.

3. On the concurrent findings of the Court below that the Petitioners did enter upon the land on the date of occurrence and obstructed the complainant and his sons from ploughing the land, the question is whether they are guilty of the offence of trespass. Mere entry by the Petitioners on the land would not constitute trespass unless the prosecution succeeds in establishing that the accused committed trespass with one of the tenants specified in Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code, namely that they did so with the intent to insult, annoy, intimidate or commit an offence. Intention must always be gathered from the circumstances of the case and one matter which has to be considered is the consequences which naturally flow from the Act, because a man is usually presumed to intend the consequences of his own act. But that is only one of the elements which the Court has to take into consideration. What the Courts have to find is whether the real intention of the accused was to annoy or the real intention was something else and annoyance is so mere consequence which was neither intended nor desired. The proposition that every person intends the natural consequences of his act is often so convenient and helpful rule to ascertain the intention of persons while doing so particular act. But it is wrong to accept this proposition as a binding rule which must prevail on all occasions and in all circumstances. The ultimate question for decision being whether an act was done with a particular intention, all the circumstances including the natural consequences of the action have to be taken into consideration. See Smt. Mathri and Ors. v. the State of Punjab 1964 S.C.D. 557.

4. Admittedly plot No. 1633 is the Gochar land of the village Chhachina. This land according to the Amin measures 5 to 7 adores. The Amin does not remember which one acre out of this plot had been leased out to the opp. party. The villagers of Chhachina were interested in the gochar land of the village and this fact is recognised by the learned Sessions Judge in his appellate order. There is no evidence to show that the one acre of land said to have been leased out to the complainant had been clearly demarcated. It was suggested to the co