Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, applies only when the offence involved in the two cases is the same. The principle of double jeopardy does not apply to cases where the offences are distinct and separate.

JUDGMENT :

A. Pasayat, J. - Petitioner's stand that Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the 'Code') comes to their aid having been turned down by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhadrak (in short, 'CJM'). this application for interference has been filed.

2. A brief resume of the background facts would suffice. GR Case No. 1402 of 1990 was instituted on the basis of information ledged by a Grama Rakhi for alleged commission of offence punishable u/s 160 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short MPC). Petitioners and five others faced trial and were acquitted in the said proceeding by learned CJM. Subsequently, another GR Case No. 597 of 1991 with which present dispute is concerned was instituted. Allegation related to commission of offence u/s 323, IPC. Petitioners claimed shelter u/s 300 of the Code, but learned CJM found their plea untenable. Learned CJM held that Section 300 comes into operation only when offence involved in the two cases is same. So far as the case at hand is concerned, he held that Section 300 of the Code had no application.

3. Mr. S. Ghose, learned counsel for petitioners submitted that Section 300 of the Code is intended to take care of situations like the one involves in the present dispute. According to him a different colour has been given to the same occurrence, and in the former case nine were involved ; whereas four have been implicated in the latter case alleging commission of different offences. Genesis of dispute and witnesses were same and therefore, conclusion arrived at by learned CJM in GR Case No. 1402 of 1990 operated in all fours to the latter case. Miss. Sanju Panda, learned counsel for State submitted that u/s 300 of the Code a person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remain in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under Sub-Section, (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under Sub-section (2) thereof. According to her Section 300 has no application to the facts of the case.

4. Section 300 is an amplification of well known maxim of law nomo debet bis suniri pre uno deliete that is to say, that no person should be twice vexed for the same offence. This principle does not rest on any doctrine of estoppel but embodies the well-established rule of common law that a man may not be put twice in peril for the same offence. The principle which ought to have been enacted in the section Is that no man should be vexed with several trials for offences arising out of the identical acts committed by him. There is nothing like res judicata in a criminal trial as long as it does not terminate in either acquittal or conviction so as to attract the provision of this section. The principle is that of the common law pleas of autrefois acquit (formerly acquitted) and autrefois convict (formerly Convicted) the question of double Jeopardy is secured both by Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India as well as by Section 300 of the Code. But the ambit and content of the guarantee in Article 20(2) are much narrower than those of common law of England or the doctrine of double jeopardy of Section 300 of the Code. The plea of double jeopardy differs from the rule of issue estoppel in a criminal trial Where an issue of fact has been decided by competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of the accused such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a b"r to the trial-and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as barring reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact in a subsequent or different trial of the accused. And this is known as the rule of estoppel. This rule differs from the pl