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1974 Supreme(Ori) 117

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
B.K. Patra, J.
PRAVAKAR DAS AND OTHERS - APPELLANT
Versus
SUBAL PADHAN - RESPONDENT
Second Appeal No. 13 of 1971
Decided On : 01-03-1974

Advocates Appeared:
R.N. Sinha, for the Appellant; B.H. Mohanty, for the Respondent

The doctrine of pious obligation does not extend to a daughter-in-law discharging a time-barred debt incurred by her father-in-law.

Headnote:

LEGAL NECESSITY - ALIENATION BY LIMITED OWNER - DISCHARGE OF TIME BARRED DEBT - WHETHER LEGAL NECESSITY - DOCTRINE OF PIOUS OBLIGATION - EXTENT - WHETHER APPLIES TO TIME BARRED DEBT INCURRED BY FATHER-IN-LAW - TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882, SECTION 43.

Fact of the Case:

Kanchan, the widow of Kina, sold the disputed property to the Respondent under Ext. A, claiming legal necessity to discharge debts incurred by Kina and for her maintenance. Appellant No. 1, Pravakar, Kina's adopted son, challenged the sale, claiming title to the property after Kanchan's death in 1955. The trial court found no legal necessity for the sale and decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiffs. The appellate court reversed the decision, holding that the Respondent had made bona fide inquiries and was satisfied about the legal necessity for the sale.

Finding of the Court:

The High Court held that the Respondent failed to establish legal necessity for the execution of Ext. A. The court found that the evidence regarding Kina's loan was unsatisfactory and that the Respondent had not made sufficient inquiries to establish the existence of legal necessity. The court also held that the doctrine of pious obligation, which allows a son to discharge his father's debt even if it is barred by limitation, does not extend to a daughter-in-law discharging a time-barred debt incurred by her father-in-law.

Issues: 1. Whether there was legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ext. A? 2. Whether the doctrine of pious obligation extends to a daughter-in-law discharging a time-barred debt incurred by her father-in-law?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the Respondent failed to establish legal necessity for the execution of Ext. A. The court found that the evidence regarding Kina's loan was unsatisfactory and that the Respondent had not made sufficient inquiries to establish the existence of legal necessity. 2. The court held that the doctrine of pious obligation, which allows a son to discharge his father's debt even if it is barred by limitation, does not extend to a daughter-in-law discharging a time-barred debt incurred by her father-in-law.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the appellate court, and restored the judgment of the trial court. The court decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT :

B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs against a reversing judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Cut tack in a suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession, and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession. Nidhi and Kina were two brothers being sons of one Panu Das. Kina's sons were Hari and Gouranga, As Nidhi had no son, he had adopted Hari, Plaintiff No. 1 Pravakar is Hari's son. Gouranga died in the years 1929 leaving behind his widow Kanchan, but, no issues. Kina died in the year 1940. During the life time of Nidhi and Kina they had, separated from each other. The property in dispute in this litigation was admittedly self acquired property of Kina.

2. On 25-11-1954, Kanchan executed the Kabala Ext. A, in respect of the disputed property in favour of Respondent Subal Padhan. It was recited in the sale deed that the sale was,necessary to procure, funds to discharge certain debts which Kina had incurred and also for her own maintenance. Shortly before the execution of Ext. A and at a time when Kanchan was still alive, Appellant No. 1 Pravakar alleging that he has become,entitled to the disputed property executed two sale deeds in respect of portions thereof (Exts. 1/a and 2/a) in favour of Appellants 2 and 3. As these two Appellants created disturbance in possession of the Respondent, there was, a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, between the Respondent on one side and Appellants 2 and 3 on the other. That proceeding terminated in favour of Appellants 2 and 3. The Respondent Subal there upon instituted Title Suit No. 320 of 1959 against all the three Appellants for declaration of his title to the disputed property on the ground that he had purchased the property from' the limited owner Kanchan who executed the sale deed for legal necessity. That trial Court found inter alia that there was legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ex. A, and consequently Subal acquired a valid title to the disputed property. He, therefore, held that Exts. 1/a and is executed by Appellant No. 1 in favour of Appellants 3 and 2 respectively, were invalid and inoperative. He accordingly passed a decree in favour of Plaintiff Subal Padhan (Respondent in this case). On appeal (T.A. 10/107 of 1964) the appellate Court held inter alia that Appellant No. 1 being not a party to the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, he was not a necessary party to the suit and therefore dismissed the suit as against the present Appellant No. 1 In these circumstances, he did not consider necessary to discuss the evidence regarding the existence or otherwise of any legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ext. A. That appeal was disposed of on 5-7-1965 and shortly thereafter the suit giving rise to this appeal was field.

3. The substantial defence put up on behalf of Defendant is that there was legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ext. A and consequently that document is valid and the Respondent acquired a valid title to the disputed property. The trial Court arrived at the finding that there was no legal necessity for Kanchan to sell the disputed property to the Defendant under Ext. A. He further found that although by the time Exts. 1/a and 1/b were executed by Appellant No. 1 in favour of Appellants 2 & 3, Appellant No. 1 had not acquired a fun title to the disputed property, because by then the limited' owner Kanchan was still alive, Plaintiff-Appellant No. 1 acquired, full title to the property after the death of Kanchan in 1955 and therefore by operation of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, Plaintiffs 2 and 3 must be deemed to have acquired title to the property. He, therefore decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. The Respondent Subal appealed. The appellate Court came to hold that the Defendant-Respondent on making bona fide enquiries was satisfied about the existence of legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ext., A and that consequ








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