1996 Supreme(Ori) 213
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
P.C. Naik, A. Pasayat, JJ.
SUPERINTENDENT, LIVE STOCK AND BREEDING FARM - APPELLANT
Versus
PRAHALLAD BARIK AND ANOTHER - RESPONDENT
O.J.C. No. 4847 of 1992
Decided On : 09-12-1996
Additional Government Advocate, for the Appellant; S.B. Das, R.N. Acharya and P.C. Das, for the Respondent
The definition of 'industry' in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is wide and inclusive, and the focus in determining whether an activity is an industry is on the functional and decisive test of the nature of the activity, with special emphasis on the employer-employee relationship.
Headnote:
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - SECTION 2(J) - INTERPRETATION - 'INDUSTRY' DEFINED - ACTIVITIES OF LIVE STOCK AND BREEDING FARM HELD NOT TO BE AN INDUSTRY.
Fact of the Case:
The Superintendent of L.B.D. Farm, Cuttack challenged the award of the Labour Court holding that the Live Stock and Breeding Farm (the farm), a unit of the Veterinary Department of the State, was an industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act). The employee, Prahallad Barik, was terminated from service by the management of the farm with effect from December 24, 1983. A reference was made by the Government of Orissa to the Labour Court for adjudication of the legality and justification of the termination.
Finding of the Court:
The Labour Court held that the farm was an industry and the employee was a workman attracting the application of the Act. The court distinguished a previous decision of the Orissa High Court which held that the Veterinary Department of the State was not an industry.
Issues: 1. Whether the Live Stock and Breeding Farm is an industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? 2. Whether the activities of the farm are commercial in nature?
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the definition of 'industry' in Section 2(j) of the Act is wide and inclusive, encompassing various activities such as business, trade, undertaking, manufacture, calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation. The court emphasized that the focus in determining whether an activity is an industry is on the functional and decisive test of the nature of the activity, with special emphasis on the employer-employee relationship.
Final Decision: The court allowed the writ application, set aside the award of the Labour Court, and remitted the matter back to the Labour Court for fresh adjudication. The court directed the Labour Court to consider the factual position and the legal principles discussed in the judgment and to permit the parties to lead further evidence.
JUDGMENT :
A. Pasayat, J. - The Superintendent of L.B.D. Farm, Cuttack calls in question legality of award by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa, Bhubaneswar (in short, the 'Labour Court') in I.O. Case No. 103 of 1990 holding that the Live Stock and Breeding Farm (in short, 'the farm), unit of Veterinary Department of the State, is an industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short, the Act').
2. Factual position is almost undisputed, Service of Prahallad Barik (hereinafter referred to as 'the employee') were terminated by the management of the farm (referred hereinafter as) 'management' with effect from December 24, 1983. A reference was made by the Government of Orissa in the Labour and Employment Department on the basis of a complaint lodged by the employee and following reference was made to the Labour Court for adjudication :
"...Whether the termination of services of Sri Prahallad Barik by the management of Live Stock ant Breeding Farm, Cuttack with effect from December 24, 1983 is legal and/or justified ? If not, to what relief is Sri Barik entitled ?"
Management took a stand that establishment in which the employee was working is not an industry and therefore, the Act had no application. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in OJC No. 3203 of 1990 decided on February 7, 1991 wherein it was observed that Veterinary Department of the State is not an industry. Said decision was distinguished by the Labour Court holding that in the said case, the labourers were appointed on contract basis for 5 years by the Government, and the Veterinary Department at Phulbani had no milk or manure business like that of the establishment in the present case. Therefore, the farm was an industry, and the employee was workman attracting application of the Act.
3. Petitioner has urged that Veterinary Department being not an industry, and alleged activities of the farm being not commercial in nature, decision of the Labour Court is indefensible.
Stand of the employee on the other hand is that though the Veterinary Department may not be considered as an industry as defined u/s 2(j) of the Act, yet the activities of the farm were commercial in nature, and it had nothing to do with the sovereign function of the Government, and since the activities of the unit were clearly linked with business or trade, it is an industry.
4. It is accepted by the learned counsel for parties that in case it is held that the farm is not an industry, reference has to be declared incompetent. For resolution of the controversy it is necessary to take note of Section 2(j) which is the pivotal provision and reads as follows :
"(j) 'Industry' means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen."
There was no definition of 'industry' in the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, the fore-runner of the present Act. Though an elaborate amendment has been made to the provision of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, the same, i.e., Section 2(c) has not yet been given effect. The existing provision has undergone variegated judicial interpretations. The definition is based on the Australian Statute, i.e., Section 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904. However, in using Australian cases with a text book approach is perhaps not noticed, as in a great body of those cases the problem was presented in its many facets and the approach was pragmatic.
A definition is ordinarily the crystalisation of legal concept promoting precision and rounding of blurred edges, but the definition in Section 2(j) viewed in retrospect has achieved the opposite as was observed by the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and Others. The definition of 'industry' as given in the statute is both exhaustive and inclusive and is ambivalently comprehensive in scope. It is in two parts. The first part s