JUDGMENT :

A.S. Naidu, J. - The order passed by the District Judge, Khurda in Arbitration Appeal No. 89 of 2003 rejecting a petition filed by the petitioner u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is impugned in this appeal.

2. The question that arises for consideration is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application made u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

3. Admittedly the appellant-Corporation entered into an agreement with the respondents on 26.3.1993. Certain disputes cropped up between the appellant and respondent No. 2 (Indian Oil Corporation) in respect of sell of petroleum products. In consonance with Clause 18 of the agreement the said dispute was referred to a sole arbitrator. The said arbitrator gave his award on 27.2.2002. Being aggrieved by the award, the appellant filed an Appeal u/s 34 of the Act before the District Judge, Khurda on 25.2.2003 with a prayer to set aside the same. According to the appellant, it received a copy of the award on 6.3.2002, but due to certain inadvertent reasons could not file the application u/s 34 till 25.2.2003. The learned District Judge came to a categorical finding that the Appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed u/s 34(3) of the Act. He further held that the period of limitation prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 34 period of limitation prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 34 is absolute and unextendable, and accordingly held that the petition u/s 34 filed by the appellant being grossly barred by time, the Appeal could not be entertained and dismissed the same. The said order of the District Judge is challenged in this appeal invoking jurisdiction of this Court u/s 37(1)(b) of the Act.

4. Mr. Hota, learned counsel for the appellant, forcefully submitted that the appointment of the Arbitrator was contrary to the terms of the agreement and that it was not expected that the said arbitrator should have acted independently and impartially; He further submitted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to arbitration proceedings and the finding of the District Judge that the time prescribed u/s 34 could not be extended under any circumstances js erroneous and it is a fit case where the impugned order should be set aside and so also the award.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this Court should not traverse beyond the order passed by the District Judge. It is further emphatically submitted that Section 34(3) of the Act is very specific and the District Judge has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the appeal filed by the appellant u/s 34 was grossly barred by time and could not be entertained.

6. Section 34(3) of the Act reads as follows :

"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award :

(1) *** *** ***

(2) *** *** ***

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made u/s 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal :

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."

7. Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribed a period of limitation of thirty days for an application under the Arbitration Act, 1940 for setting aside an award from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award. The present Act prescribes in its own provision, i.e. Sub-section (3) of Section 34, the period of limitation for such an application. The limitation prescribed is three months from the date on which the party making the application received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made u/s 33 from the date on which that