The meaning of the expressions "residence" and "normal route" in the context of workmen's compensation claims.

JUDGMENT :

A. Pasayat, J. - This appeal has been preferred by the Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela Steel Plant (hereinafter referred to as the 'employer') u/s 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (in short, the 'Act') challenging the order passed by the Asst. Labour Commissioner and Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Rourkela (in short, the 'Commissioner') in W.C. Case No. 5 of 1991.

2. Background facts as portrayed for parties sans unnecessary details are as follows :

One, Basu Charan Mohanty (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was an employee of the employer, when he lost his life in an accident on April 21, 1990. The accident took place near Fertilizer English Medium School. The deceased was taken to the Fertilizer Hospital at about 8 a.m.. He was given first aid treatment in the said hospital, and later on was removed to the Ispat General Hospital where he breathed his last at 2.50 p.m.. The deceased had been allotted a quarter in Sector-8, bearing No. D/45 and on the date of accident had gone to attend duty in 'C' shift. He was constructing a house at Balijodi and was on his way to the said house, after duty hours. A memorandum of settlement (hereinafter referred to as the 'settlement') between the employer and its workmen represented through a recognised Union, inter alia, provides that workmen's compensation benefits extend to injury cases causing death or permanent/temporary disablement arising during journey from residence to place of work and back if the accident takes place on the normal route of journey to the place of work. His widow lodged a claim for compensation of Rs. 65,000/- on the ground that the death occurred due to accident which arose out of and in course of his employment under the employer. The dispute is whether it was so. According to claimant, the accident took place around 6.15 a.m., while the deceased was taking his normal route to his residence. Employer's stand on the contrary is that the accident did not arise out of and in course of his employment. Since the deceased was allotted company's quarter bearing No. D/45 in Sector-8 and his duty was over at 6 a.m. he should have returned to the said quarter. Instead he was found unconscious on the road in front of Fertilizer English Medium School and was taken to the Fertilizer Hospital at about 8 a.m.. The provisions of Clause 8.10.2 of the settlement refer to normal route between the plant and residence of the deceased, and it does not cover Fertilizer Township which is in the opposite direction and was far away from the place of residence. The Commissioner held that the accident arose out of and in course of employment, and that claimant was entitled to Rs. 63.920/-

3. In support of the appeal, learned Counsel for the employer has stated that the Commissioner has misinterpreted the relevant provisions of memorandum of settlement and his conclusion is not supportable by materials on record. It is stated that claimant, has accepted that place of residence of the deceased was the allotted quarter and therefore, Commissioner's conclusions that the accident is covered by Clause 8.10.2 of the settlement are erroneous. Learned Counsel for claimant, however, submitted that considering the limited scope of appeal u/s 30 of the Act, there is no scope for any interference. It is further submitted that expression "normal route" used in the settlement does not necessarily mean the shortest route, and in any event, it refers to a residence. A residential house was being constructed by the deceased at Balijodi, where the deceased was staying and therefore the Commissioner was justified in his conclusion. Reference is made to the report of official enquiry, which according to him establishes that the deceased was not staying in the quarter allotted to him and the same was in occupation of another person.

4. There can be no dispute to the general proposition advanced by learned Counsel for claimant that the scope of interference in an appeal