The Magistrate has implicit power to entertain the Investigating Officer's prayer for discharge and release the accused-petitioner during the investigation.

JUDGMENT :

S. Pujahari, J. - Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the State.

2. This criminal revision is directed against an order dated 21.09.2015 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Salipur on a petition of the Investigating Officer to discharge the petitioner who was forwarded in G.R. Case No. 622 of 2015 corresponding to Salipur P.S. Case No. 160 of 2015.

3. Facts relevant for disposal of this criminal revision are as follows:-

A report was lodged against the present petitioner in the aforesaid case by the father of the deceased-Ashok Kumar Patra indicating the petitioner to have committed the murder of his son along with his two relations inside the Ashram of the petitioner. On receipt of the aforesaid report, police registered the aforesaid case and conducted investigation and basing on the statement of the informant and other materials, arrested the petitioner and forwarded him to the Court. The Court, thereafter, remanded the petitioner in exercise of power under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "Cr.P.C) when the investigation of the case was in progress. However, during the course of investigation, as the Investigating Officer found that the petitioner was not the real perpetrator of the crime, but some other persons were involved, some of them were apprehended and forwarded to the Court and a petition was filed under Section 169 of Cr.P.C. to discharge the petitioner. The Learned J.M.F.C., Salipur, however, refused to discharge the petitioner as there is no explicit provision in such circumstances to discharge an accused who is said to have been remanded to custody pending completion of the investigation. The same has been assailed in this criminal revision to be unjust and improper inasmuch as in view of the subsequent development and also the application of the Investigating Officer that the petitioner was innocent and wrongly forwarded, the learned J.M.F.C., Salipur ought to have discharged the petitioner.

4. During course of argument, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that notwithstanding absence of any explicit provision in the Cr.P.C. empowering the Magistrate to discharge an accused during pendency of the investigation, a person who has been taken to custody, can be released on his own bond, or on bail, or under the special order of a Magistrate, as provided under Section 59 of Cr.P.C. Section 167 of Cr.P.C., also by necessary implication empowers the Magistrate to discharge an accused, against whom during the course of investigation, police finds no sufficient material.

5. Learned counsel for the State, however, defends the order of the Magistrate to be just and proper.

6. A bare perusal of Chapter-XII of the Cr.P.C. would show that police on receipt of a report of a cognisable offence has to register a case and conduct investigation and during course of investigation, if he finds ground to believe the information to be credible and if it appears to him that the investigation cannot be completed within twenty-four hours, pending completion of the investigation, he shall forward the accused, if in his custody upon arrest, to the Magistrate who is empowered under Section 167 of Cr.P.C. to authorise detention of the accused in custody beyond twenty-four hours. The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction, provided that the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, b