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1991 Supreme(Ori) 380

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
S.C. Mohapatra, J.
RABINDRANATH JENA - APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF ORISSA - RESPONDENT
Criminal Revision No. 204 of 1987
Decided On : 03-05-1991

Advocates Appeared:
P. Roy and S.K. Ghose, for the Appellant; D. Das, A.S.C., for the Respondent

An accused person cannot be punished separately for offences under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC if the offences arise from the same act.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SEC. 118-A - OFFENCE - INGREDIENTS - FAILURE TO STOP THE VEHICLE AFTER ACCIDENT - PUNISHMENT.

Fact of the Case:

Accused, a government driver, was driving the Superintending Engineer's car when he hit a five-year-old girl, causing her injuries. He then fled the scene, but the car was later detained by the police. Accused was charged with offences under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 118-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

Finding of the Court:

The trial court and the appellate court convicted the accused of all three offences and sentenced him to one month's imprisonment for each offence, to run consecutively. The High Court upheld the convictions and sentences.

Issues: 1. Whether the accused was driving the car rashly and negligently, causing the accident and injuries to the girl. 2. Whether the accused committed the offence under Section 118-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by failing to stop the car and provide information after the accident. 3. Whether the accused should be punished separately for the offences under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the evidence clearly established that the accused was driving the car rashly and negligently, causing the accident and injuries to the girl. The court noted that the accused was driving at a high speed in a village and that he failed to take any precautions to avoid the accident. 2. The court held that the accused committed the offence under Section 118-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by failing to stop the car and provide information after the accident. The court noted that the accused was obliged to stop the car and provide information under Section 87(1)(c) of the Act. 3. The court held that the accused should not be punished separately for the offences under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC because the offences arose from the same act. The court noted that Section 71 of the IPC provides that where an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such offences.

Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the accused's revision petition, subject to modifying the sentence. The court reduced the fine for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC to Rs. 100 and the fine for the offence under Section 118-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to Rs. 100.

JUDGMENT :

S.C. Mohapatra, J. - Accused is the petitioner in this Criminal Revision against his conviction and sentence affirmed in appeal.

2. Petitioner, a Government servent is a driver of a truck belonging to the State Government under the Superintending Engineer (P. W. D ) SambaJpur. On 2-7-1980, PW 13 who was the Superintending Engineer was coming from Sambalpur to Bhubaneswar in official work in his own car ORP9160, engaged the accused to drive the car.

3. Prosecution case is that while petitioner was coming from Sambalpur side driving the car in high speed with PW 13 as the occupant on National High Way "No 42 at about 5 p m. at village Bimalabeda within Jarpada Police-station, the car dashed against PW 2 a girl aged about five to six years at that time as a result of which PW 2 sustained simple injuries. Injuries were treated by the doctor (PW 10) at Angul I ospital. After causing accident, the car was driven away by accused which was detained at Dhenkanal by Sadar Police-station on basis of wireless massage received. After investigation accused was charge-sheeted to face trial where he pleaded not guilty and denied the occurrence.

4. On assessment of evidence, trial Court found petitioner guilty of offence under Secs. 279 and 337, IPC, and Section 118-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Convicting petitioner offences under the aforesaid section, learned Sub Judge sentenced him to undergo R. I. for one month for each offence and directed the sentences to run consecutively. In appeal, learned Sessions Judge maintained the conviction and sentences.

5. Mr. P. Roy, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that in view of discrepancy in respect of colour of car, prosecution case that accused caused the accident, ought to have been disbelieved. PW 2 the injured stated that a black car dashed against her. PW 4 an eye-witness stated that a black Ambassador car caused the accident. PWs 7 and 8 also stated the colour of car to be black. PW 11 stated that he got wireless message that white Ambassador car caused the accident and left the spot of accident. Submission of Mr. Roy would have substance if registration number would have also varied. Since registration number is the same, both Courts are correct that the car which was driven by accused caused the accident.

6. Mr. Roy, learned counsel submitted that in the maximum the car was driven in a high speed as stated by the witnesses. What speed would be treated as high speed varies from person to person. Besides high speed by itself may rot amount to rashness or negligence in driving. It is true that high speed by itself may not amount to either rashness or negligence. In case of rash act, the criminality lies in running the risk of doing such act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequence. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. This has been so explained in 1968 S.C.D. 198 (Balachandra Waman Patha v. State of Maharashtra). To the same effect is the decision reported in Moinuddin Mozumdar Vs. State of Assam, .

7. In this case witnesses clearly state that the car driven by the accused dashed against the child inside a village. It was coming in high speed. There is no dispute that accused was driving the car. He was the best person to explain the circumstance which led to the accident. PW 13 the occupant could have also stated about the rashness or negligence if any. Accused denied the occurrence. PW 13 stated that he did not know of the accident till car was detained at Dhenkanal Both Courts on appreciation of evidence came to conclusion that the car was driven both rashly and negligently. Even if I might have taken a different view if I would have been the app














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