The court's decision emphasized the importance of abiding by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and allowing the petitioners to intervene in the application pending before the Supreme Court.

JUDGMENT :

K.S. Jhaveri, J.

By way of all these writ petitions, the petitioners, who are owners of the respective vehicles, have challenged the Notification No.1183 (E) dated 29/12/2016 issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, New Delhi, Government of India amending Rule 81 of the Central Vehicle Rules, 1989 (for short 'the Rules') levying additional fees of fifty rupees for renewal of fitness certificate for each day of delay after expiry of fitness certificate which was incorporated at Column No.3 at Sl.No.11 of the table.

2. Learned counsels for the petitioners submit that the levy of additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness for renewal has been introduced by way of amendment of the Motor Vehicle Rules, particularly the entry at Sl.No.11, Column No.3 of the Table of Rule 81 issued by the Government of India. It is vehemently argued that the aforesaid notification is illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable, excessive and unconstitutional and the same violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the same is liable to be struck down to the extent of imposition of additional fee as stated above and the same may be declared to be void in the interest of justice. Learned counsel for the parties also argue that in view of Hon'ble Madras High Court decision, the charging of additional fees is also required to be declared void and struck down.

2.1. It is also submitted that the Government may, if it considers necessary so in public interest, by general or special order, exempt any class of persons from payment of any such fees either in part or in full. The power of Section 211 of the Motor Vehicles Act is restricted on levy of fees alone and does not extend to levy of additional fee as proposed in the impugned notification.

2.2. In support of the contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as different High Courts:

(i) Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. reported in, (2004) 6 SCC 254.

(ii) All India Jamiatul Quresh Action Committee vs. Union of India reported in, (2018) 5 SCJ 545.

(iii) T. Rajakumari and Ors. Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. reported in, (2016) AIR Madras 177.

(iv) Mr. Shiv Kumar vs. Union of India, represented by Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice and Ors. reported in, (2014) AIR Karnataka 73.

(v) Textile Technical Tradesmen Association and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in, (2011) 1 LLJ 297 Mad.

(vi) Chennai City Auto Ootunargal Sangam and Ors., vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways decided on 03.04.2017 by Hon'ble Madras High Court in W.P.No.1598 of 2017.

(vii) Order dated 04.09.2017 and 21.02.2018 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Diary No.22817 of 2017 and Civil Appeal No.(s) 11216 of 2017.

(viii) Ayodhya Yadav, S/o. Siyaram Yadav vs. Union of India and another decided on 30.11.2018 by the Hon'ble Chhatisgarh High Court in W.P.(C) No.841 of 2018.

2.3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that in view of the decisions as stated above, levy of additional fees cannot be held to be justified and valid. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra), more particularly, in paragraphs 21, 22, 28 and 29 has held as under:

“21. A parliamentary legislation when receives the assent of the President of India and published in an Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner. A writ court, it is well settled would not determine a constitutional question in vacuum.

22. The court must h