The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the Limitation Act in the context of recovery of dues under the State Financial Corporations Act, particularly regarding the period of limitation for action under Sec.29 and Sec.31 of the S.F.C. Act.

JUDGMENT :

A.K. Rath, J.

Defendants are the appellants against the reversing judgment.

2. Case of the plaintiff-respondent was that it was a partnership firm. The firm availed a loan from the defendants in the year 1961 to establish a cold storage. Due to disturbance of electricity supply, the firm could not be carried on business and became sick. The defendants issued a notice under Sec.29 of the State Financial Corporations Act (in short, "S.F.C. Act") in the year 1986. Plaintiff filed a suit in the court of Munsif, Puri for permanent injunction. The defendants initiated a proceeding under Sec.31 of the S.F.C Act in the court of the learned District Judge, Puri. The same was withdrawn to initiate a fresh proceeding under Secs.29 and 31 of the S.F.C. Act. Thereafter, the defendants issued notice under Sec.29 of the S.F.C Act to recover the dues of Rs.7,10,965.05 ps. The plaintiff requested the defendants to accept an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- and settle the outstanding dues, but the same was turned down. The claim is time barred. With this factual scenario, the plaintiff instituted the suit for declaration that the defendants are not entitled to recover the outstanding dues since the same is time barred and permanent injunction.

3. Defendants filed a written statement pleading, inter alia, that the plaintiff availed the loan. The plaintiff became a chronic defaulter. The claim was not barred by time. As on 31.12.1997 the outstanding dues on the plaintiff was Rs.35,95,326.76 ps.

4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck nine issues. Parties led evidence, oral and documentary. Learned trial court dismissed the suit holding that the Corporation cannot simultaneously pursue two remedies i.e. one under Sec.31 of the S.F.C. Act and another under Sec.29 of the S.F.C. Act. The Corporation can take recourse to Sec.29 of the S.F.C. Act even after an order under Sec.31 of the S.F.C Act has been passed. Its right is not extinguished. The District Judge allowed the petition for withdrawal of the petition under Sec.31 of the S.F.C Act filed by the Corporation. The Corporation is not precluded from taking action under Sec.29 of the S.F.C Act. The Court cannot injunct the statutory body from exercising the statutory power. Assailing the judgment and decree, plaintiff filed T.A. No.11 of 2001 before the learned District Judge, Cuttack. Learned appellate court held that special statute does not exclude the operation of the Limitation Act. As there is no specific provision in the S.F.C. Act providing the period of limitation to start a proceeding under Sec.29 or Sec.31 of the S.F.C. Act and there being no bar for application under the Limitation Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply. Period of limitation shall commence from the date of recall the notice issued on 18.6.1988 vide Ext.3 under Sec.30 of the S.F.C. Act. Article 137 of the Limitation Act shall apply. Thus the period of limitation is three years from the date of notice under Sec.29 of the S.F.C. Act. The defendants cannot take recourse to the provisions of Sec.29 of the S.F.C Act for realisation of dues from the plaintiff as the period of limitation of three years from 18.6.1988 has already expired. Taking a cue from the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Orissa State Financial Corporation v. Sri Sailendra Narayan Patnaik, 2011 (1) OrissaLR 87, it held that the proceeding under Sec.31 of the S.F.C Act is in the nature of execution proceeding of the decree and as such, the period of limitation would be 12 years under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. The period of limitation to start a proceeding under Sec.31 of the S.F.C Act is 12 years from 18.6.1988. Held so, it allowed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the appeal, the original plaintiff died; whereafter his legal heirs have been substituted.

5. The second appeal was admitted on 13.01.2003 on the following substantial questions of law;

"(i) Admittedly