Point of Law: Criminal Law - Offence of Murder - Bail granted - There is no premeditation or pre-plan and petitioner/accused has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner and incident had happened in a heat of passion during a quarrel.

JUDGMENT :

S.K. Panigrahi, J.

1. The present petitioner, who is in custody, has filed the instant bail application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. in connection with C.T. No.36 of 2020 arising out of G.R. Case No.476 of 2020 pending in the court of the learned Sessions Judge, Nabarangpur. The petitioner herein is the accused in connection with alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. Prior to the instant application, the petitioner also approached the learned Sessions Judge, Nabarangpur in C.T. No.36 of 2020 for grant of bail which was rejected on 19.04.2021.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts of the present case are that on 03.06.2020, the deceased got into an altercation with the petitioner when the deceased went to ask for his wages. The altercation led to a heated fight and due to the sudden provocation, the petitioner pushed the deceased and dealt fist blows to him. The deceased was then taken to his home, where he stayed for the next five days. After suddenly experiencing pain in his chest on 08.06.2020, he was rushed to the DHH, Nabarangpur, but he succumbed to death enroute. Following his death, the niece of the deceased filed the FIR at Kodinga P.S. on 08.06.2020. Investigation commenced and the present petitioner was arrested for the alleged commission of offence under Section 302 of the I.P.C.

3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that that the petitioner cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 302 of IPC. The Court attention was drawn to the post mortem report which records that no injury was found on the body of the deceased. In fact, the deceased was an alcoholic due to which his liver was said to be found in a state of cirrhosis. It was also vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the act was done on account of sudden and grave provocation and no motive can be attributed to it. Moreover, there was a delay of five days between the date of the incident and his death during which time period the deceased was okay considering he or his family members had not thought of seeking any medical help.

4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State vehemently opposed the release of the petitioner on bail on the ground of seriousness of the allegation.

5. The principles with regard to grant of bail are well settled, which have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in numerous pronouncements especially in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 wherein it has been laid down the following principles which are to be borne in mind, while deciding petition for bail:

“(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”

6. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC 118, has laid down the following criteria for grant of bail:

“24. Section 439 (1) Cr.PC of the new Code, on the other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail. Unlike under Section 437 (1) there is no ban imposed under Section 439 (1) Cr PC against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High Court or the Court of Session will be approached by an accused only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after the investigation has progressed throwing light on the evidence and circumstances implicating the accused. Even so the H