The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951, regarding the correction of record of rights and the rights of intermediaries and sebayats.

JUDGMENT :

R.K. Pattanaik, J.

1. The Petitioner filed the instant writ petition invoking writ jurisdiction under Article(s) 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 assailing the correctness of the impugned order (Annexure-1) dated 17th August, 2009 passed in OEA Revision Case No.67 of 1984 under Section 38-B of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as ‘OEA Act’) whereby settlement of the schedule lands by the Tahasildar, Sonepur (OP No.3) was set aside with a direction to correct the record of rights in favour of the deity, namely, OP No.6 without providing any opportunity of hearing to him and therefore, it is not sustainable in law and thus, liable to be interfered with.

2. Pursuant to the above direction under Annexure-1, OP No.3 passed order dated 19th September, 2009 (Annexure-2) and accordingly, corrected the RORs in favour of OP No.6 deleting the names of the Petitioner and others therefrom. As per the Petitioner, OP No.1, who passed the order (Annexure-1) under challenge, fell into serious error to hold that the Petitioner and others do not have any rights vis-à-vis the schedule lands without properly appreciating the relevant facts on record. Thus, according to the Petitioner, the record of rights have been corrected erroneously by the order under Annexure-1 and that too without offering opportunity of hearing to him, which, therefore, deserves to be set aside.

3. Heard Mr. S. Sourav, learned counsel for the Petitioner; Mr. D.K. Mohanty, learned AGA and Mr. S.P. Mohanty, learned counsel for OPs.

4. The case of the Petitioner is that previous to the 1st settlement operation, the concerned village was a non-gountia village under the Barpalli Zamidar, who had the absolute right to settle lands in favour of persons rendering services in different capacities and one of such settlement was kuladebata maufi, which was for providing service to a deity, namely, Pattakhanda Devi, in the name of one Ganga Dehuri, the common ancestor, who was rendering seva puja to such private deity of the Zamindar. It is claimed that the Petitioner acquired the interest from his maternal side and finally vide OEA Case No.516 of 1976, the lands were settled in favour of the respective parties and since share of his mother fell to him, it was so recorded vide Annexure-3. It is the contention of the Petitioner that OP No.6 was established only about 40 years back but the case lands were settled with their common ancestor much prior thereto and thus, are in no way connected with the performance of seva puja of the deity nor it ever belonged to the deity, however, by the order under Annexure-1, OP No.1 directed correction of record of rights fully ignoring the above facts and also overriding a decree of the civil court, which was obtained by the Proforma OPs.

5. In fact, as per the claim of the Petitioner, rayati lands have been taken over by the impugned order under Annexue-1 by misreading the facts on record with a conclusion that the deity to be the ex-intermediary and not the parties, who were in possession of the schedule lands. It is contended by the Petitioner that OP No.1 committed illegality in concluding that devatwa maufi has been loosely used for debottar maufi. It is further contended that the Barpalli Zamindar allowed their common ancestor to possess the said schedule land as Maufidars which is included in the definition of ‘intermediary’ as per Section 2(h) of the OEA Act and it was in connection with rendering seva puja to a private deity, the fact which was completely lost sight of by OP No.1, who held it as debottar maufi. Apart from the merits of the case, the Petitioner contends that the matter should be remanded for a de novo hearing since he was not provided any opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order under Annexure-1.

6. OP No.6 filed counter affidavit and justified the decision of OP No.1 and contended that the predecessor-in-interest of the family to which the Petitioner belongs was