The main legal point established is that to succeed in a suit for possession brought on title, the Plaintiff must establish permissive possession of the Defendant, failing which the suit may be dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

The original Appellant, by filing this Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, ‘the Code’), has assailed the judgment and decree dated 30.07.1992 and 14.08.1992 respectively passed by the learned District Judge, Koraput, Jeypore in title Appeal No. 27 of 1991.

By the same, the Appeal filed by the present Respondent (Plaintiff) under section 96 of the Code has been allowed whereby the judgment and decree dated 14.08.1991 and 24.08.1991 respectively passed by the learned Munsif, Koraput in Title Suit No.36 of 1991 have been set aside and the suit filed by the Appellant, as the Plaintiff, has been dismissed and thus, he has been non-suited.

2. For the sake of convenience, in order to avoid confusion and bring in clarity, the parties hereinafter have been referred to, as they have been arraigned in the Suit.

3. The Plaintiffs’ case is that one Sribachha Mishra was the owner of the suit land described in Schedule-A of the plaint. He had entrusted the Plaintiff for looking after of his immovable property including the suit land and permitted him to construct a house on the land and stayed therein. The Plaintiff was residing in that land at Semiliguda till March, 1964. The Defendant, who was earlier known to the Plaintiff, came and stayed on a portion of the suit land on the western side by putting up a hut. The hut got burnt in the year 1965. So, the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to permit to occupy the suit land by constructing a kuchha house over there with an assurance that he would vacate the same when would be so required by the Planitiff. The Plaintiff accordingly permitted the Defendant to do so over the land specifically described in Schedule-B of the plaint, which is a part of Schedule-A.

The Plaintiff’s further case is that by registered sale deed dated 16.03.1981 on payment of consideration of Rs.2000/-, he purchased schedule-A land from said Sibachha. Thus, he became the owner of the entire land in Schedule-A which includes Schedule-B land. Pursuant to the said sale, he has also mutated the said land in his favour. The Plaintiff, with a view to remodel his house and utilize the entire land, when requested the Defendant to vacate that the portion of Schedule-B land in his occupation, the Defendant, then asserted his title over the suit property. So, the suit came to be filed.

4. The Defendant, coming to contest the suit, has filed the written statement. In his written statement, he has stated that he occupied Schedule-B land which was lying fallow and constructed his house over there and started running a hotel. The house was burn in the year 1966 and he constructed a pucca building and continued to run his hotel in the name and style of “Shankar Hotel”. It is his case that he has been in continuous possession of the suit land for more than 40 years and has perfected title by way of adverse possession. The ownership of Sribaccha Mishra in respect of the suit land as pleaded by the Plaintiff is denied and the case projected by the Plaintiff that the Defendant was so permitted by him to remain in occupation of Schedule-B land has been refuted.

5. Faced with the rival pleadings, the Trial Court has framed six issues. On examination of evidence and their evaluation, the Trial Court has first of all answered that Sribachha was having the right, title and interest over the suit land and by virtue of purchase of the same by registered sale deed, the Plaintiff has acquired the right, title and interest. In saying so, having gone to say that the Plaintiff has failed to establish his claim of acquisition of title by way of adverse possession, the suit filed by the Plaintiff had been decreed.

The First Appellate Court being moved by the aggrieved by the Defendant, sat over to judge the sustainability of the findings of the Trial Court. On extensive discussion of evidence on record and their critical analysis, it has been held that the Plaintiff, by virtue of his long standing possession of Schedule