The main legal point established is that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to grant bail is regulated by the punishment prescribed for the offence in which the bail is sought, and the nature of the offence added during the investigation determines whether the accused must seek fresh bail.

1. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that earlier an FIR was registered against petitioner and other co-accused for an offence punishable under Sections 382, 34 IPC; petitioner was enlarged on regular bail; however, during the investigation Section 397 IPC was also added against the petitioner and other co-accused. Learned counsel has further stated that an offence under Section 397 IPC is punishable with maximum imprisonment for 7 years and is not punishable with death or life imprisonment. Therefore, on furnishing bail bonds for the newly added offence, petitioner should be allowed to continue on bail and he is not supposed to seek fresh bail for the added section.

2. Notice of motion.

3. On being asked, Mr. K.D.Sachdeva, Addl. AG, Punjab accepts notice on behalf of respondent - State,

4. With the consent of both the counsel, present petition is being disposed of finally today itself.

5. Perusal of the record reveal that earlier FIR No.58 dated 3.6.2010at Police Station Division No. 8, Ludhiana was registered against the petitioner and other co-accused for an offence under Sections 382, 34 IPC. Petitioner was enlarged on regular bail, however, subsequently, during the investigation Section 397 was also added against the petitioner. Offence under Sections 382, 34 IPC is triable by the Magistrate, however, an offence under Section 397 IPC is triable by the Court of Sessions.

6. Learned Addl. A.G. Punjab has vehemently argued that in view of the dictum of the Apex Court in the matter of Prahlad Singh Bhatti v. NCT, Delhi and another, (2001) 4 Supreme Court Cases 280 : (AIR 2001 SC 1444 : 2001 Cri LJ 1730), petitioner has to seek fresh bail for newly added Section 397 IPC which is triable by the Sessions Court while petitioner was enlarged on bail for the offence under Sections 382, 34 IPC triable by the Court of Magistrate.

7. Honble Apex Court in the matter of Prahlad Singh Bhatti (supra) has observed as under :

"7. Powers of the Magistrate, while dealing with the applications for grant of bail, are regulated by the punishment prescribed for the offence in which the bail is sought. Generally speaking if punishment prescribed is for imprisonment for life and death penalty and the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail unless the matter is covered by the provisos attached to Section 437 of the Code. The limitations circumscribing the jurisdiction of the Magistrate are evident and apparent. Assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the application is distinguishable from the exercise of the jurisdiction.

9. In the instant case while exercising the jurisdiction, apparently under Section 437 of the Code, the Metropolitan Magistrate appears to have completely ignored the basic principles governing the grant of bail. The Magistrate referred to certain facts and the provisions of law which were not, in any way, relevant for the purposes of deciding the application for bail in a case where accused was charged with an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437 (5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that "I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld. Prosecutor inasmuch as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law". With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Inst