The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement of exceptional circumstances to suspend conviction, especially in cases of corruption, and the consideration of the conduct leading to the conviction in granting interim relief.

1. This order will dispose of an application under Section 389, Cr. P.C. for suspension of judgment of c6nviction dated December 11, 2003 of Special judge, Faridabad in case FIR No. 249, dated May 1, 2002 under Sections 384, 342, 120-B, IPC and Section 13 of the Prevention of Cor -ruptionAct, 1988, (sic) Police Station Hodal, District Faridabad.

2. The appellant has been convicted by the trial Court i.e. Special Judge, Faridabad, vide judgment dated December 11, 2003. The statutory first appeal against the conviction order is pending in this Court as admitted. The sentence of imprisonment stands already suspended by granting him the concession of bail vide order dated January 6, 2004.

3. The appellant-applicant referring to the merits of the cases submits that the appellant has been acquitted under Sections 342 and 120-B, IPC raising a doubt regarding the stiltedly of prosecution version, the complainant Prabhu Dayal, P.W. 6 and Dr. Jagdish P.W. 7 has not supported the prosecution case regarding the appellant and his co-accused Mukhtiar Singh resulting in acquittal of appellant under Sections 342 and 120-B, IPC. The conviction of the appellant and his co-accused Mukhtiar Singh that they extorted money is not maintainable. The complaint Ex. PA has been presumed to be proved by the trial Court on the basis of the testimony of the investigating officer P.W. 10 and SDM, Hodal, P.W. 9. Once P.W.6 and P.W. 7 have turned hostile, the credibility of testimony of investigating officer stands impeached. The conviction of appellant under section 13(i)(d)(ii) and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act for misconduct is not sustainable. It is averred by the appellant that the Deputy Commissioner. Faridabad, has issued a show cause notice dated February 4, 2008 which was delivered at the residence of the appellant on February 8, 2008 for imposing penalty of dismissal from service.

4. The application for suspension of conviction has been opposed by counsel for the respondent contending that there are no extraordinary exceptional circumstances to grant the relief of suspension of conviction. Reliance has been placed on State of Punjab V/s. Deepak Mattu, 2008 Cri LJ 322 and K. C. Sareenv. C.B.I., Chandigarh, 2001 (6) SCC 584 : (2001 Cri LJ 4234).

5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as State counsel and gone through the judgments cited by State counsel. So far as the legal position is concerned, a perusal of judgments of K. C. Sareen V/s. C.B.I. Chandigarh. 2001 (6) SCC 584 : (2001 Cri LJ 4234); Union of India V/s. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434; State of Maharashtra V/s. Gajanan, 2004 (1) RCR (Cri) 317 : (2004 Cri LJ 919); K. Bhagyanath V/s. State, 2003 (1) RCR (Cri) 145 (Delhi); State of Punjab V/s. Deepak Mattu, 2008 Cri LJ 322 and Tarsem Singh V/s. State, Chandigarh Administration, 2006 (1) RCR (Cri) 831 : (2006 Cri LJ 1378), would indicate that the power to suspend conviction exercising jurisdiction under Section 389, Cr. P.C. during the pendency of appeal has been recognised but there are certain parameters formulated for the exercise of said powers. In Deepak Mattus case (supra), the Hon ble Apex Court clarified that the exercise of power to suspend the order of conviction should be exercised in limited and very exceptional cases. Merely because a convicted person has filed an appeal challenging the conviction should not be considered sufficient enough to suspend the operation of the order of conviction. It is the duty of the Court to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such convictions in abeyance. The Apex Court observed that admission of appeal against the order of conviction and suspension of sentence of imprisonment can generally be passed as refusal of such relief would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, dehors the sentence of impriso