The central legal point established in the judgment is that the nature of the dispute, as determined by the substance of the relief sought, is crucial in determining jurisdiction and court-fee valuation, and that undervaluation can be addressed during the proceedings.

1. This order will dispose of two Civil Revision Nos. 1805 of 2007 (Anil Sabharwal v. Arun Sabharwal) and 1806 of 2007 (Sunil Sabharwal v. Arun Sabhawal). The facts are being taken from Civil Revision No. 1805 of 2007.

2. Petitioners and respondents, a closely related business family, are contesting a suit which arises out of the Memorandum of Understanding/Family Settlement giving rise to subsequent disputes and differences between them. Respondents Arun Sabharwal and others filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Patiala for declaration that Memorandum of Understanding/Family Settlement entered in between the petitioners and respondents No. 1 and 2 a legal, valid, binding between the parties and further for rendition of accounts in regard to the profits made by defendants-petitioners by sale of products in the area of the respondents under the Trademark of Kesh Nikhar etc. and for payment of damages on account thereof. When served with the notice, the petitioners filed application dated 1-2-2007 for rejection of the plaint. Plea is that the petitioners are not residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Patiala and there is no cause of action against petitioner No. 2. It is further pleaded that the dispute raised is regarding trademark and as such Court of District Judge alone would be competent to adjudicate upon the alleged infringement and not the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Patiala. Even objection in regard to suit haying not been properly valued for the purposes of court-fee is also raised.

3. The respondent-plaintiffs filed reply to the said application pointing out that subject-matter of the family settlement, profits and business is regulated at Patiala. According to the respondents, the case has no concern with the trademark and hence the suit is properly instituted before the Civil Judge. It is further pleaded that the suit is properly valued for the purposes of court-fee.

4. Civil Judge has found that respondent-plaintiffs have not alleged any violation of any trademark in the plaint and the present suit filed is for declaration and rendition of accounts and for damages for the loss caused. Reference is made to the ratio of law laid down in Kuldip v. Babit Nayar, 2004 (2) Civil Court Cases 673, wherein it is held that there is no objective standard for valuation on the basis of which Court can arrive at a definite conclusion under Order 7, Rule 11(b), CPC for directing a plaintiff to affix the court-fee on that basis. Further reference is made to the case of Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh v. Paras Nath Singh, 2002 (1) LJR 773 : (AIR 2002 SC 233) to say that the court-fee has to be paid on the plaint as framed and not on the plaint as it ought to have been framed. It is further observed that it is the substance of the relief sought and not the form which will be determinative of the valuation and the payment of the court-fee. By referring to the case of State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh Chowhan, 2005 (2) CCC 37 : (2005 AIHC 846), it is noted that when the Court is unable to say what the correct valuation of the relief is, it cannot require the plaintiff to correct the valuation as has been made by him. It is further observed that in such cases the Court has no other alternative than to accept the tentative valuation made by the plaintiff and that in cases of compensation there is no objective standard available which can help to determine the amount to which the plaintiff should value the relief claimed by him. Accordingly, the application moved for rejection of the plaint is dismissed, which is impugned by way of the present revision petition.

5. Mr. M. L. Sarin, the learned Senior counsel has made three-fold submission before me. He would first contend that the suit is grossly undervalued and as such the Civil Judge is misconceived in passing the impugned order declining the application in regard to this obligation. He would also contend that the dispute clearly r