The main legal point established in the judgment is that a 3rd party claiming independent title and possession over the contracted property is not a necessary party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale.

Vinod K.Sharma, J.

1. By way of present revision petition, the petitioner have challenged the order dated 22.3.2006 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Malerkotla, vide which the application moved by the petitioners under Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been dismissed.

2. The plaintiff-petitioners filed a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 19.12.2002. Along with the suit an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 21 of C.P.C. was also filed in which the respondent was restrained from alienating the suit land in any manner. In the said suit, Sarvshri Jasbir Singh and Jagdeep Singh, sons of Mohinder Singh, had moved an application dated i 1.12.2003 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the C.P.C. for being impleaded as a party on the plea that the there was an agreement to sell dated 7th December 2002 qua the suit land in their favour which was executed by Avtar Singh defendant. The plaintiff-petitioners contested the said application on the ground that the remedy of Jasbir Singh and Jagdeep Singh was to file a separate suit on the basis of alleged agreement of sale. The said application was dismissed by the learned civil judge (Jr. Division) Malerkotla, vide order dated 12th May, 2004 by observing as under:

In view of the above discussion and law laid down by Honble Punjab and Haryana High Court the applicants are not at all necessary party. However, if they have any right or interest in the property in dispute on the basis of an agreement to sell; they are at liberty to file a separate civil suit against defendant. Finding no merit in the application the same stands dismissed. Now to come up for evidence of plaintiff on 2.9.2004.

3. The plaintiff-petitioners pleaded that Sarvshri Jasbir Singh and Jagdeep Singh did not apply for consolidation of suit filed by them and by concealing material fact from the Court obtained a decree for specific performance. The said judgment and decree was got executed by the Court and sale-deed in their favour was executed on 27.1.2005. The case of the petitioners was that in view of this development, it became necessary for the petitioners to implead them as a party as also to amend his suit to challenge the subsequent judgment and decree as well as the sale deed executed in favour of Sarvshri Jasbir Singh and Jagdeep Singh.

4. The learned trial Court took note of the fact that the application moved by Jasbir Singh and Jagdeep Singh for being imp leaded as a party was challenged by the petitioners on the plea that they would be at liberty to file a separate suit and, therefore, it was not open to the petitioners to claim now that they were necessary parties to the present suit. The learned trial Court further noticed that in the written statement filed by Avtar Singh, a specific objection was taken that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as there was an agreement to sell in favour of Jasbir Singh and Jagdeep Singh. This assertion was also opposed by the petitioner. The learned trial Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the subsequent sale in favour of Jasbir Singh and Jagdeep Singh did not make them necessary parties to the suit for specific performance and accordingly the application moved by the petitioners was dismissed.

5. Mr. Arun Palli, learned Counsel for the petitioners challenged the order primarily on the ground that the application moved was necessary for dispensation of justice as in view of the subsequent development, no effective decree can be passed in the absence of Jasbir Singh and Jagdeep Singh. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and Anr. V/s. K.K. Modi and Ors., wherein it was held that the amendment of pleadings should be liberally allowed since procedural obstacles ought not to impede the dispensation of justice. This plea of the petitioner prima facie