The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the maintainability of a second complaint and the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

1. Chhattar Singh-petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for quashing of the complaint dated 5-1-1990 (Annexure P-1) and the order dated 26-8-1993 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jhajjar, vide which his application for dismissal of the second complaint has been rejected.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 25-3-1985, a sample of turmeric powder was taken from the shop of the petitioner by the Food Inspector under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The said sample was found to be adulterated by the Public Analyst. Consequently, on 29-4-1985, a complaint was filed by the Food Inspector against the petitioner under Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. After the trial, the petitioner was convicted for the said offence by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jhajjar vide judgment dated 25-1-1988. Against that judgment, petitioner filed an appeal and the same was accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Rohtak on 28-10-1988. The conviction of the petitioner was set aside and the matter was remanded with a direction to the trial Magistrate that proper charge be framed against the accused and thereafter the case be decided as per law. On remand, a fresh trial was again started against the petitioner. On 29-9-1989, when the Food Inspector, who is the complainant, was examining his witnesses in order to prove the charges against the petitioner, the complaint was dismissed in default and accused was ordered to be discharged, as the complainant was not present. Thereafter, on 6-10-1989 an application was filed by the Food Inspector before the trial Court for restoration of the case by giving sufficient cause for not appearing in the case on 29-9-1989. The said application was contested by the petitioner. On 5-1-1990. Food Inspector made a statement before the Court for withdrawal of the aforesaid application for restoration of the case, which was duly recorded and on the basis of the said statement, the aforesaid restoration application was dismissed and the file was consigned to the record. Immediately, on the same day, the second complaint was filed by the Food Inspector on the same facts and allegations against the petitioner. In the said complaint, the petitioner was summoned by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Jhajjar. Pursuant to the issuance of summons, the petitioner appeared and on 10-6-1993 filed an application before the trial Court to the effect that second complaint filed by the Food Inspector is not maintainable in view of the fact that the first complaint filed against him was dismissed on 29-9-1989 and he was ordered to be discharged. On the same facts and allegations, the second complaint is not maintainable. Therefore, he prayed that the proceedings against him are liable to be quashed. The learned trial Court did not agree with the contention of the petitioner and rejected his application vide order dated 26-8-1993 (Annexure P-2). This order as well as the filing of second complaint (Annexure P-1) has been challenged in the present petition with a prayer for quashing the same under Section 482 of the Code.

3. Shri J. S. Bedi, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two-fold contentions before me. The first point argued by him is that dismissal of the first complaint, whether for default or on merits, has the same effect of exonerating the accused of the allegations and so long as that order remains, a second complaint is not maintainable in law. The second contention is that in case it is held by this Court that the second complaint is maintainable, even then looking to the delay caused in the present case, which is pending since 1985 and in view of the hard fact that the petitioner has faced the agony of the protracted trial from the last 17 years without any fault att