The inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be exercised with great restraint and only when there is abuse of process of court or ends of justice demand it.

Nirmal Singh, J.

1. This is a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short, "the Code") for quashing FIR No. 183 dated 22.6.1999 registered under Sections 498-A/406/323/506,I.P.C at Police Station Samalkha, District Panipat and the charge-sheet dated 24.11.1999.

2. At the hearing learned Counsel for the petitioner conceded that framing of charge is a revisable order and against that revision lies under the Code. When an alternative remedy is available under the Code, the petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. Reliance can be placed upon Balabhadra Dash and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Ors., 1991 Cri. LJ 2457, in which his Lordship has held as under :

"Inherent power is wide in nature and Section 482 in Cr.P.C. having been made to secure ends of justice or to pi event abuse of the process of Court, such power is to be exercised with great restraint. Wider would be the power, greater should be the restraint. Ordinarily trial of an accused in a criminal prosecution is to be concluded under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and High Court would be reluctant to conclude the same at an interim stage. Therefore, prayer for quashing charge or taking cognizance ought not to be entertained in a routine manner and unless High Court is satisfied that there is abuse of process of Court or ends of justice demand it, such prayer ought not to be entertained. Even if, such prayers are entertained, all endeavours should be made to examine if the abuse of powers of Court can be eradicated without bringing the proceeding to an end in the midway. Where accused would be put to such inconvenient position that subsequent examination of these questions would materially affect him which would be irreparable in nature, High Court can for reasons to be recorded in that regard, examine the materials to interfere with the continuance of trial. Therefore, where all the accused persons had an opportunity to advance submissions before the Magistrate that materials on record do not call for framing of charge against them, High Court declined exercise of inherent powers for quashing cognizance. In subordinate authority normally higher authority should not exercise its powers to give same relief."

3. In Mohan Lal and Anr. v. State, 1974 Crl. LJ 1407, it has been held as under :

"The inherent power of the High Court under that provision, to my mind, cannot be pressed in aid for the purposes of indirectly undoing or modifying an order which is appeal able or revisable and has become final because no appeal or revision was filed against it or having been filed were dismissed thus giving finality to the same. The order of the learned Magistrate dated 17th January, 1969 and the appellate order there from are not in challenge in these proceedings."

4. This petition cannot be entertained on another score also. The FIR was lodged on 26.6.1999. After the investigation the report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. presented before the Ilaqa Magistrate and the learned Trial Court after perusing the documents prima facie, found the case against the petitioner and the charge was framed on 24.11.1999. The petitioner has not filed any revision against the order of charge sheet. The petitioner has filed this petition after the expiry of more than two years. No doubt, for filing a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C, no limitation has been prescribed but it does not mean that a party can file a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. whenever it likes. However, a petition should have been filed within a reasonable period. The period of 90 days which is at par with a revision should be treated as reasonable and if any petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is filed beyond the period of 90 days, the petitioner should explain the cause of delay.

5. In the instant case, no plausible explanation has been given for not filing the petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. within the reasonable period nor any application for condoning the delay has bee