The order of rejection of the memorandum of appeal is not a decree and the appeal against such an order is not competent.

B.Rai, J.

1. This Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by Sadhu Ram one of the defendants against the judgment and decree dated August 30, 1979, of the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Ambala, whereby application under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act preferred by Sadhu Ram before him was rejected.

2. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that when the appeal was filed before the learned District Judge it was entertained without there being any objection as to the forum. The appeal remained pending before the learned District Judge for a considerable long time, and it was on January 10, 1978, that the appeal was ultimately returned to be filed in a proper forum. The appellant lost no time and filed the same the very next day in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge who then was exercising the enhanced appellate powers. It was also argued that according to the allegation of the parties there was a chhan in the bara in dispute and that chhan being temporary structure cannot be treated as a building. As such, the learned counsel who filed the appeal before the District Judge treated the suit as a land suit, calculated the valuation thereof more than Rs. 250/- and acting bona fide the appeal was filed in the Court of the District Judge who ultimately returned the same for filing it in a Court of competent jurisdiction.

3. On the other hand, it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no allegation that the property was being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient to the agricultural or it was assessed to land revenue. Therefore, the property in dispute cannot be treated as a land and the suit as a land suit. It was further argued that Shri Jasmer Singh Advocate, who filed the appeal in the court of the District Judge, had a long-standing at the bar, was having vast experience and well-known Advocate on the civil side. He was expected to know the correct legal position as also the correct position about the forum where the appeal was to be filed. He, however, did not take care to know the legal position about the forum but filed the appeal in the Court of the District Judge. Even during the pendency of appeal, an objection was raised on behalf of the respondents regarding the maintainability of the appeal in the Court of the District Judge, but still he did not withdraw the appeal to file the same in a Court of competent jurisdiction and pursued the same in the Court of the District Judge, which was not the right forum for institution of the appeal. It is not disputed that vide this Courts notification No. 113-Gax/XXI C. 6 dated May 6, 1976 under Section 39(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 , the then Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, was invested with the powers to entertain and dispose of the appeals up to a value of Rs. 500/-. A scrutiny of the record would show that value of the suit for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction was Rs. 400/- being the market value of the property in dispute and a court-fee of Rs. 55/- was paid on the plaint. A sum of Rs. 400/- was taken to be the value of the appeal which certainly was less than Rs. 500/-. The learned counsel for the appellant could not dispute the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that an objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal before the District Judge was raised on April 27, 1977. Despite that objection the appeal was not withdrawn for filing the same in a court of competent jurisdiction and was pursued up to January 10, 1978 when the appeal was ordered to be returned for presentation before a court of competent jurisdiction by the learned District Judge, Ambala. Therefore, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the learned counsel who instituted the appeal in the Court of District Judge, Ambala had committed a bonafide mistake, acted in good faith and pursued the appeal in a bonafide manner. The record doe