PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
S.P.Kurdukar and Swatanter Kumar JJ.
Jagroop Singh Gill
Versus
State Of Punjab
Civil Writ Petition No. 6846 of 1994,
Decided On : MARCH 1, 1995
MUNICIPAL LAW - SUPERSESSION OF MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE - PUNJAB MUNICIPAL ACT, 1911 - SECTION 238 - COURT QUASHES NOTIFICATION SUPERSEDING MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE FOR VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 238.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, elected members of the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, challenged the Notification issued by the Government of Punjab superseding the Committee for a period of one year. They alleged that the Notification was issued without any basis and for mala fide reasons, and that the Government failed to provide them with an opportunity to show cause before issuing the Notification.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the Government did not furnish a copy of the report on which the Notification was based to the petitioners, nor did it give them an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. The Court also found that the Government did not record its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practical to provide an opportunity of hearing to the Committee, as required by the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911.
Issues: 1. Whether the Government's failure to provide the petitioners with a copy of the report and an opportunity to show cause violated the principles of natural justice? 2. Whether the Government's failure to record its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practical to provide an opportunity of hearing to the Committee was a valid exercise of power under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the right of hearing is a substantive right and that the principles of natural justice require that a party be given an effective hearing before an authority takes an action that would visit the party with civil and/or pecuniary consequences. 2. The Court held that the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, is an exception to the rule and cannot be treated as an independent rule in itself. The Court further held that the Government must satisfy itself and record reasons that it is not reasonably practical to give an opportunity of hearing to the Committee before invoking the proviso.
Final Decision: The Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the Notification superseding the Municipal Committee, and restored the status quo ante.
SWATANTER KUMAR and J JJ.
1. The petitioners in this writ petition have challenged the Notification dated 9-5-1994 issued by the Government of Punjab, Department of Local Government, Chandigarh, superseding the Municipal Committee (now Municipal Council), Bhatinda, for a period of one year.
2. The relevant facts giving rise to the present petition are that petitioner No. 1 is the President, petitioner No. 2 is the Vice-President and petitioners No. 3 to 15 are the Municipal Commissioners of Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, were held on 6/09/1992. There are 29 members in the Municipal Committee. The petitioners basic grievance is that there are groups in the Municipal Committee, and the group led by Shri Atma Singh, who has the blessing of the local M.L.A. from that area and who is the Minister in the present Ministery in the State, have persuaded the Government, without any basis and for mala fide reasons, to issue the Notification in question superseding the Municipal Committee. The further allegation in the petition is that the group led by Shri Atma Singh which was in minority could not break the majority of the group of the petitioners, and has, therefore, adopted this unfair via media to achieve their object, which they have done issuing the Notification dated 9/05/1994, Annexure P/1 to the petition.
3. Various grounds of attack have been raised in the petition, but the counsel for the petitioners has mainly stressed the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and non-compliance of the provisions of Sec. 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
4. The respondent have file a detailed counter and their stand is that the Government has taken a conscious decision and formed a considered view that it is necessary in public interest to take immediate preventive steps and ensure safety of municipal records from being tampered or concealed. Therefore, they state to have suspended the Committee.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the patties at great length, and we propose to decide the petition on the principal contention raised by the counsel for the petitioners and in view of this it may not be necessary to deal with other contentions. Before we deal with respective contention raised by the learned counsels, it will be appropriate to look into the relevant provisions. Sec. 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act, under which the respondents have taken the action and issued the impugned notification (Annexure P-1) reads as under: -
"238. Suspension and supersession of Committee.- (1) If, in the opinion of the State Government a committee is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of, the duties imposed on it by or under this Act or any other law or exceeds or abuses its powers, the State Government; may, by an order published, together with the statement of reasons thereof, in the official Gazette, declare the committee to be incompetent or in default or to have exceeded or abused its powers, as the case may be, and suspend it for such period not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order. Provided that the State Government may, by notification, for reasons to be specified therein, extend the aforesaid period of suspension, from time to time, for a period not exceeding one year in aggregate. (2) If, at any time after the expiry of the period of suspension, the committee again acts in the manner referred to in sub-section (1), the State Government, by a like order, supersede the committee for such period as may be specified in the order. (3) Before making an order of suspension, or supersession, opportunity shall be given to the committee to show cause why such an order should not be made. Provided that it shall not be necessary to give such opportunity where it is not reasonably practical to do so. (4) When a committee is suspended or superseded by an order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)- (a) in the case of an order of suspe
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.