The benefit of dowry primarily falls on the husband, and the remedy for the return of dowry articles under the Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act should be sought elsewhere.

U. S. Bedi, J.

1. The present petition has been directed for quashing of F. I. R. No.405 dated December 21, 1992 registered under Sections 498-A/406 of the Indian Penal Code in Police Station, Samalkha, District Panipat, at the instance of Smt. Rajmati respondent No.2, Petitioner No.1 is the husband of the said respondent whereas petitioners Nos.2, 3 and 4 are the father, mother and sister of petitioner No.1. It has been stated in the complaint on the basis of which the present F. I. R. has been registered that the parties were married way back in 1988 and various articles of dowry given to the respondent No.2 were entrusted to all the accused at the time of marriage. It is further the allegation that the petitioners ill-treated respondent No.2 after the marriage and ultimately on May 24, 1992, turned her out of the matrimonial home along with her two minor children. The quashing of the F. I:r. has been sought on various grounds. It has been argued by Mr. Baldev Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner that the offence under Sec.498- A of the Indian Penal Code was committed within the jurisdiction of Jind and as such, the Courts at Panipat, had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter. He has also urged that the offence under Sec.406 of the Indian Penal. Code is also not made out as the F. I. R. did not disclose as to which article had been entrusted to each accused and the same being vague, was liable to be quashed on this ground alone. For this assertion, he has relied upon Angrej Singh and others V/s. State of Punjab and others, Sandeep Sharma V/s. Neha Sharma and Jatinder Singh and others V/s. State of Haryana and others.

2. Lastly, it has been urged that from the admitted facts, it was clear that petitioner No.4, Krishna, was only eight years old at the time of the marriage and as such, no question of entrustment of any dowry article to her could arise.

3. Mr. Anil Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, the complainant wife has controverted the arguments of Mr. Baldev Singh learned counsel for the petitioner. He has urged that even if no specific entrustment had been made to any of the accused, the F. I. R. was not liable to be quashed on this ground. He has argued that from the reply filed by respondent No.2, it was evident that petitioner No.1 had filed a civil suit in the Court of Sub Judge lind Class, Jind, seeking a declaration that respondent No.2 was no more his wife since April 23, 1992, he having divorced her under the Muslim Law. He has also urged that even a Muslim lady who had been divorced by her husband, was entitled to recover her dowry articles by virtue of the provision of the Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, 1986, hereinafter called the Act.

4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the facts of the case and the judgments cited, it appears to me that the present petition is liable to succeed though partly. It cannot be denied that in the course of marriage, the benefit of the presents given by the family of the bride would fall primarily on the husband. It can, therefore, be safely inferred that Rajinder Pal Petitioner No.1 was admittedly the recipient of the dowry articles that had been given by the brides family at the time of marriage. It is also to be seen from the reading of the complaint that there is no allegation of any specific entrustment having been made to each of the accused and as would be evident from the various paragraphs of the complaint which had been read out by Mr. Baldev Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners. In this view of the matter, the judgments cited by Mr. Baldev Singh, do advance his case. It is also to be noted that respondent No.2 also sought to involve petitioner No.4 Krishna, who was admittedly 8 years old at the time of her marriage and is now 14 years of age. Proceedings against petitioner No.4 would, therefore, be barred by virtue of the provisions of Sec.3 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.