A transfer of property during the pendency of litigation is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and a subsequent vendee is bound by the decree passed in the litigation, irrespective of whether the vendee had notice of the litigation.

1. The petitioner impugns the order of the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Punjab, dt 14th Aug. 1985, Annexure-P1, whereby her prayer under Section 111 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act for partition of the land in question has been rejected on the ground that since there was a question of title involved the subordinate revenue authorities should stay their hands till that question of title was settled either by the Assistant Collector First Grade himself constituting into a Court or by the Civil Court under the Civil P.C. In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, the following facts deserve to be noticed.

2. On 19th Mar. 1958, the petitioner agreed to purchase the share of Kartar Singh son of Mit Singh in the suit land which he was holding jointly with Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh sons of Phula Singh in equal shares, i.e., one-third. As prior to the date of the performance of this agreement Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh purchased the share of Kartar Singh (one-third share in the joint holding), the petitioner filed a suit against them all, i.e., Kartar Singh, Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh for the specific performance of the agreement dt. 19th Mar. 1958. Though she failed in the trial Court yet she succeeded in this Court on 27th April, 1977, when a decree for specific performance was granted in her favour. During the pendency of this litigation Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh transferred the very land which they had purchased from Kartar Singh in favour of respondents 5 to 10. Having succeeded in the civil litigation referred to above and a sale-deed having been executed in her favour as a consequence of the same, the petitioner filed the present application for partition of her share in that land. In these proceedings a plea was taken by respondents 5 to 10 that they were bona fide purchasers without notice and were, therefore, not bound by the decree passed in favour of the petitioner by this Court on 27th April, 1977. This plea of theirs was consistently negatived by the Assistant Collector First Grade, the Collector, and the Additional Commissioner but, as already indicated above, it was accepted by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals).

3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, I find that the petitioner must succeed. By now it is well laid down that in the case of a transfer which is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act the question of good faith which is essential to be established before an equitable relief can be granted in favour of a subsequent vendee under Section 41 or S.51 of the Transfer of Property Act is totally irrelevant (see Shanu Ram V/s. Basheshar Nath (1966) 68 Pun LR (D) 44). In the face of this settled legal position, the plea raised on behalf of respondents 5 to 10 that they were bona fide purchasers without notice from Paramjit Singh and Jagjit Singh was obviously of no consequence. Respondents 5 to 10 having purchased the property from these two vendors during the pendency of the civil litigation against them are bound by the decree passed against them, i.e., the vendors and, in view of that, no question of title remained to be settled between the parties, i.e., the petitioner and the subsequent vendees.

4. At this stage it is urged by Mr. Ashok Bhan, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents, that subsequent to the passing of the impugned order by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals) the Assistant Collector First Grade as a matter of fact passed an order on 3rd Oct. 1985, directing the petitioner to go to the Civil Court to establish her right vis-a-vis respondents 5 to 10. He urges that since this later order of the Assistant Collector has not been impugned in this petition, the petitioner deserves to be non-suited on that score alone. I, however, see no merit in this stand of the learned counsel. It is not disputed that the order passed by the Assistant Collector on 3rd