Engaging a counsel does not absolve the litigant from actively participating in the case, and an advocate should not withdraw from engagement without sufficient cause and notice to the client.

Hemant Gupta, J.

1. The defendant is in revision petition aggrieved against the order passed by the Courts below whereby application for setting aside of ex parte decree was dismissed.

2. In a suit for recovery filed on behalf of the plaintiff, the defendant put in appearance through his Advocate on 15.05.1995 after filing power of attorney and sought time to file written statement. Time was granted to the defendant to file written statement again on 12.6.1995. Subsequently, on 21.07.1995 adjournment was sought as written statement could not be filed. Adjournment requested was granted on payment of Rs. 50/-as costs. On 11.8.1995, costs were paid but written statement still was not filed and time was granted on payment of Rs. 100/- as costs. On the next date i.e. 5-9-1995, neither written statement was filed nor costs were paid but learned Counsel for the defendant made a statement that he has no instructions. Since the defendant was not present, he was proceeded against ex parte. The case was adjourned for ex parte evidence on 23.9.1995. Subsequently, ex parte decree was passed on 2.11.1995. The present petitioner moved an application for setting aside ex parte decree on 25.10.1999 which has been dismissed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned first Appellate Court. It has been found that the petitioner has not stepped into the witness box. Rather he has examined one Gurbachan Singh Lamberdar who has deposed that Lachman Dass petitioner was getting threats from militants in 1994 and, therefore, the petitioner remained underground from November, 1994 in order to protect his life. It has been found that such plea was not raised in the application and that such plea is not tenable in view of the fact that terrorism came to an end in 1992-1993 and, therefore, there is no question of the petitioner remaining underground due to fear of terrorists in November, 1994.

3. Before this Court, the only argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that his counsel before the learned trial Court has pleaded no instructions on 5.9.1995 but the learned trial court has not issued any notice to the defendant-petitioner and, thus, he could not have been proceeded against ex parte. Reliance is placed upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in cases Tahil Ram Issardas Sadarangani and Ors. V/s. Ramchand Issardas Sadarangai and Anr., Malkiat Singh and Anr. V/s. Joiginder Singh and Ors. (1998-1) 118 P.L.R. 271(S.C), Sushila Narahari and Ors. V/s. Nandakumar and Anr. (1996-3) 114 P.L.R. 162, as well as Single Bench judgment of this Court reported as Kirpal Kaur and Ors. V/s. Kulwant Kaur and Ors. (1993-2) 104 P.L. 689 and Surinder Kumar V/s. Ram Nath and Anr. 2000(2) P.LJ. 206,

4. However, I am unable to agree with the arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The pleading of no instructions at a stage when the defendant was to file written statement cannot be a ground for setting aside of ex parte decree after more than four years. The petitioner has engaged his Advocate. The Advocate has filed power of attorney on the first date of hearing and sought adjournment. Whether in these circumstances it was the responsibility of the Advocate to run after the petitioner to coax him to file written statement is a question which arises in the present case. Honble Supreme Court in Kedia Leather and Liquor and Anr. case (supra), while considering somewhat identical situation where the officers of the Government of India have not given information to its Advocate, observed to the following effect:

...We fail to understand why the officers of the department concerned have not shown any sense of urgency to intimate the decision, if any taken, to the learned Counsel well before the date of hearing rather than leaving it to the learned Counsel to ascertain from them if any decision has been taken. Is it not the responsibility of the officers concerned to keep the counsel informed of the development so that this